Main thread for Ed and Elaine Brown vs the evil IRS, Part 25

[Recumbent ReCycler]

Powdered eggs?  Yuck!!!  I haven't had them since I was in the Army.  They are some of the worst tasting egg products I've ever tried.  I remember eating a little then throwing the rest out.  They don't even taste like eggs.  Soy based egg substitute tastes much better than powdered eggs.  It is revolting to me that people who have not harmed anyone (like Bob Wolffe et al) are being threatened with harsher sentences than many convicted murderers.  It makes me feel like vomiting.   

[JosephSHaas]

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...Tom Colantuono  Re-read your U.S. Attorney Manual #664 and do the right thing.  Stop prosecuting these Four Freedom Keepers because you have NO authority to do so.  Motion into your court for a mis-trial on Ed's case. 

Something MIGHT happen to you if you don't do what's right.  Yeah: would be done to you by WHOM, plus WHERE and WHEN?  For all you know it might be God Almighty saying that you've deviated from the truth and are being called home now! Your ambassadorship has ended, or if you are of no religion, or some other religion, and have been given enough time to do what's right and He feels that you ought to be made an example of the phrase: the bigger they are, the harder they fall, then may your demise be witnessed with this in mind.  Your demise of what: your life, you might be asking me?  I won't tell you, you'll have to guess that.  It might be that the President is revoking his commission to you as being the jerk you are.  In violation of your oath of office.  Wise up!

-- Joseph S. Haas, with right of free speech, as guaranteed by Art. 22, N.H. + the First Amendment! There is no threat in here to do anything, and if this disturbs you then so be it!  It ought to shame you into doing the right thing.  The time for pleasantries has ended.  When I see you again you will be on my shit list! I might even give you some toilet paper, with directions on where to hurl it!  when full.  Our Legislature told you where to file your papers*, and so if not, then if you can't give, then you will receive, to receive the toilet paper award. 

* N.H. RSA Ch. 123:1 from 1-8-17 U.S. Constitution.

I got a call from Gary at about 4:30 p.m. this afternoon saying that Tom C. was/is not pleased with what I did write. I said: so what!?  I did not write it for his amusement. 

There are three paragraphs after his name, and summarized here:

A.1. read your Manual
--2. stop the prosecution
--3. file a motion

B.1. Something MIGHT happen to you...
--2. by WHO(*), WHERE, WHEN (what happened to WHAT, WHY and HOW?)
--3. The WHO, might be God Almighty
--4. The word demise has two forks in the road:
--5. Death, or: ...
--6. I will not answer to that, nor:
--7. ...from the Latin word dimittere, of "to dismiss" = "1. To discharge, as from employment. 2. To direct or allow to leave.
--8. You ARE "In violation of your oath of office."
--9. "Wise up!"

C.1. My name with rights of free speech by both constitutions.
--2. To disturb is: "1. To upset the tranquility or settled state of. 2. To intrude(*) upon; interrupt. 3. To disarrange." [So which is it here?: to upset is "To disturb the usual or normal functioning of." Then so be it, as the normal, usual or typical pattern, or the standard there of ignoring this RSA 123:1 has gone on long enough! Tom C. has a copy of this certificate of non-filing and this is an "unwanted element"(*) into his operations. The word intrude from the Latin intrudere of: to thrust in, as in to interject= from the Latin word: interjicere of: to throw between, as in to throw to him of between me in freedom and my friends incarcerated unlawfully and illegally!! Lastly of to dis-arrange, meaning: to upset the arrangement of, arrange= of to agree about, settle, and so with the prefix dis-, a most definite dis-agreement, the dis- in this case being the "invalidation" of your credentials! to void your credit or authority, your written evidence of qualification.  Thus to reverse the sentences upon both Ed & Elaine, and remove them from custody forthwith!
--3. Shame: the noun: "Have you no shame? 3. A person or thing that brings dishonor or disgrace...5. A great disappointment; + the verb: "3. To force by making ashamed: shamed into an apology."
--4. Pleasantry: "A jesting or friendly remark." The word jest from the Latin word gesta, exploits, the exploit being: noun: "A noteworthy act or deed; feat"; and verb: "1. To utilize fully or advantageously."
--5. shit list. See also http://www.lotsofjokes.com/cat_02.htm
--6. Directions to hurl toward: _____________________
--7. Give or receive papers, the choice is yours.

JSH

[JosephSHaas]

Kat,

Is there any way to retrieve what I did just TRY to write to here?  Like it being saved to a draft folder with your main office?

I'm on the State Library Computer, and got here through http://www.google.com for the words" "Ed Brown" "New Hampshire Underground", and started typing away, but then it just disappeared on me.

I checked the tabs that usually show at the bottom of the screen, but this was not there, nor was Google in the address location bar at the top of the screne!

Thanks, -- Joe

The following are: (1) findings of facts, and (2) requests for: rulings of law; that maybe one of the attorneys for the Four Freedom Keepers could file in their client's case:

1. The President of the United States appoints, and the Senate confirms, the appointments of both officers to be: (a) The United States Attorney, and (b) The United States Marshal.

2. Here in New Hampshire those offices are held by: (a) Thomas P. Colantuono, and (b) Stephen R. Monier, respectfully.

3. Both officers have taken an oath of office to obey the Constitution* of the United States of America.

4. There's a clause 17 in Article I, Section 8 of this Constitution* that reads that "Consent"** of the State Legislature is needed BEFORE the federal government can operate in any particular state.

5. Attorney Lowell "Larry" Becraft of Huntsville, Alamaba has put together an excellent website listing all fifty (50) states in the Union, and of whether they be single, or double-filing states.

6. New Hampshire is a double-filing state, in that in addition to the Registry of Deeds, certain papers from the federal government are required, by the "shall"*** word, as a must/ mandatory requirement, to be placed on file with the N.H. Office of Secretary of State.

7. That "shall"*** word is in N.H. R.S.A. Ch. 123:1.

8. That Consent** was given FROM the N.H. State Legislature TO the federal government on June 14th, 1883 ("Flag Day"), but that the TYPE of consent was a conditional consent: on the condition that they file!

9. The Secretary of State has certified that there has been no filing as required by the statute.

10 A copy of this certification was given FROM Joseph S. Haas, TO The Office of United States Attorney DURING the case of U.S.A. (I.R.S.) v. Edward Lewis & Elaine Alice Brown this past January 2007.

11 The Office of the U.S. Attorney was prosecuting this case, and that its contact person, Bill Morse either knew or should have known about this "exculpatory evidence".

12 A complaint was filed against Colantuono as Respondent Superior for his subordinate's insubordination with the N.H. P.C.C./ Professional Conduct Committee but that it was not elevated up from a grievance to that of an official complaint, because the actual prosecutor is the one to go after for a violation of Federal Rule 16 to bring this information to either: the judge or the defendant(s). See also State Rule 3.8(d) to compare to both the judge and the defendant(s).

13 Joseph S. Haas did then send an official complaint against Morse to the U.S. Attorney General in Washington, D.C. to forward it onto the state BAR in: _______ for where Morse is licensed for a disciplinary hearing.

14 Colantuono KNOWS about the fact that this court is in an unlawful position, as from it mentioned in his U.S. Attorney Manual #664, but fails to do anything about it!

15 The N.H. governor, John H. Lynch knows of his Art. 41 **** duty to enforce all legislative mandates*** but he too, refuses to do anything about it.

16 The U.S. Marshal Monier's oath of office is to execute only lawful writs, and he KNOWS that the bench warrants against the Browns were and are unlawful!

17 The Town of Plainfield and County of Sullivan took the Brown's property tax money for their bills for such Article 12 protection, but refused to protect against an outlaw federal government! Instead the Town took a $6,500 check from the Feds thanks to Sen. Judd Gregg to offset this extra expense. And the $1.00 bill into the Ed Brown Protection Fund at the N.H. State Police, has yet to be dealt with, other than their back-up to the town and county.

18 Joseph S. Haas visited Senator Judd Gregg's office this morning and requested a hearing with either the Senator and/or his delegate on this matter of that since he can confirm, he ought to be able to un-confirm, as in to dismiss both officers for dereliction of duty!

19 Joseph S. Haas did also visit Don Hill's Office of Legislative Services to see WHEN a decision of Bud Fitch's, Deputy Attorney General will be either agreed to or not in a decision for a hearing on whether to halt the governor's paychecks for not doing his job!****

20. _______________________________________________________________________

Thus like the phrase, of: twenty questions, here are my twenty findings of fact, and that ought to be placed before the federal judge Singal from Maine, a single-filing state, to say: yes: the New Hampshire case is OUT OF ORDER.  One of the defendant's attorney having written to Colantuono's subordinate as the prosecutor of that case for the receipt if any showing compliance with RSA 123:1 and if there is no answer, then to file such a Motion for Discovery, and if still not located, then to file a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdictional authority.  Thank you Judge George S. Singal.

Yours truly, - - - - - - - - - - - Joseph S. Haas, P. O. Box 3842, Concord, N.H. 03302, Tel. 603: 848-6059

pc: right now to: (1) Gov. Lynch, (2) Don Hill, (3) Bud Fitch, (4) Bill Gardner, (5) N.H. State Police, (6) Judd Gregg (7) NH PCC; later to: ( Tom Colantuono, and (9) Stephen Monier.

[coffeeseven]

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...Tom Colantuono  Re-read your U.S. Attorney Manual #664 and do the right thing.  Stop prosecuting these Four Freedom Keepers because you have NO authority to do so.  Motion into your court for a mis-trial on Ed's case. 

Something MIGHT happen to you if you don't do what's right.  Yeah: would be done to you by WHOM, plus WHERE and WHEN?  For all you know it might be God Almighty saying that you've deviated from the truth and are being called home now! Your ambassadorship has ended, or if you are of no religion, or some other religion, and have been given enough time to do what's right and He feels that you ought to be made an example of the phrase: the bigger they are, the harder they fall, then may your demise be witnessed with this in mind.  Your demise of what: your life, you might be asking me?  I won't tell you, you'll have to guess that.  It might be that the President is revoking his commission to you as being the jerk you are.  In violation of your oath of office.  Wise up!

-- Joseph S. Haas, with right of free speech, as guaranteed by Art. 22, N.H. + the First Amendment! There is no threat in here to do anything, and if this disturbs you then so be it!  It ought to shame you into doing the right thing.  The time for pleasantries has ended.  When I see you again you will be on my shit list! I might even give you some toilet paper, with directions on where to hurl it!  when full.  Our Legislature told you where to file your papers*, and so if not, then if you can't give, then you will receive, to receive the toilet paper award. 

* N.H. RSA Ch. 123:1 from 1-8-17 U.S. Constitution.

I got a call from Gary at about 4:30 p.m. this afternoon saying that Tom C. was/is not pleased with what I did write. I said: so what!?  I did not write it for his amusement. 

There are three paragraphs after his name, and summarized here:

A.1. read your Manual
--2. stop the prosecution
--3. file a motion

B.1. Something MIGHT happen to you...
--2. by WHO(*), WHERE, WHEN (what happened to WHAT, WHY and HOW?)
--3. The WHO, might be God Almighty
--4. The word demise has two forks in the road:
--5. Death, or: ...
--6. I will not answer to that, nor:
--7. ...from the Latin word dimittere, of "to dismiss" = "1. To discharge, as from employment. 2. To direct or allow to leave.
--8. You ARE "In violation of your oath of office."
--9. "Wise up!"

C.1. My name with rights of free speech by both constitutions.
--2. To disturb is: "1. To upset the tranquility or settled state of. 2. To intrude(*) upon; interrupt. 3. To disarrange." [So which is it here?: to upset is "To disturb the usual or normal functioning of." Then so be it, as the normal, usual or typical pattern, or the standard there of ignoring this RSA 123:1 has gone on long enough! Tom C. has a copy of this certificate of non-filing and this is an "unwanted element"(*) into his operations. The word intrude from the Latin intrudere of: to thrust in, as in to interject= from the Latin word: interjicere of: to throw between, as in to throw to him of between me in freedom and my friends incarcerated unlawfully and illegally!! Lastly of to dis-arrange, meaning: to upset the arrangement of, arrange= of to agree about, settle, and so with the prefix dis-, a most definite dis-agreement, the dis- in this case being the "invalidation" of your credentials! to void your credit or authority, your written evidence of qualification.  Thus to reverse the sentences upon both Ed & Elaine, and remove them from custody forthwith!
--3. Shame: the noun: "Have you no shame? 3. A person or thing that brings dishonor or disgrace...5. A great disappointment; + the verb: "3. To force by making ashamed: shamed into an apology."
--4. Pleasantry: "A jesting or friendly remark." The word jest from the Latin word gesta, exploits, the exploit being: noun: "A noteworthy act or deed; feat"; and verb: "1. To utilize fully or advantageously."
--5. shit list. See also http://www.lotsofjokes.com/cat_02.htm
--6. Directions to hurl toward: _____________________
--7. Give or receive papers, the choice is yours.

JSH

Well written and it all makes sense. Excellent!

[JosephSHaas]

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...Tom Colantuono  Re-read your U.S. Attorney Manual #664 and do the right thing...

  Thus to reverse* the sentences upon both Ed & Elaine, and remove** them from custody forthwith! ....

JSH

Well written and it all makes sense. Excellent!

Thanks Coffee. 

The bottom line is to reverse* and remove**.

I just called Tom Colontuono's office, at 225-1552, and spoke with the Receptionist saying this is Joe Haas, and that it's been several weeks now with no answer from your boss on this U.S. Attorney Manual #664. What a jerk he is for putting this off for so long. Oh, I hear you have another call coming in (ring, ring), Have him get back to me, thanks.

Sorry for typing in the blue section.  Hey Keith: can you call there? like to request a Progress Report of WHEN Tom C. will get back to me in writing about his understanding of this #664.  Maybe he doesn't understand it!? In that case he needs a refresher course in the English language.  His George Orwellian "Nineteen Eight Four" and "Doublespeak" has got to end!  Maybe the Federal Executive branch has some Policy #__ ? [like the N.H. Supreme Court Rule #__ for the judges] that requires them to go for continued education.  Yeah, to call again to find out now:

OK here it is: she said that since Tom is a N.H. Bar member he has to take an annual course, or class, but that when I asked if he was in compliance, and which course, she said that is not public information.

Well, with that I called the N.H. Bar Assn. http://www.nhbar.org at 224-6942 and the woman receptionist there said that Tom C. is a "Member in Good Standing" (as in that book of such you can find at the State Library), but that they do not give out detailed information as to what class he took and when, us having to rely on the truth as if by what, voluntary statement from the attorney that he did take the course!?  And even if he took it, that being compliance in the quantity but not the quality of a flunk? Yeah: my new name for him: a flunky, a lackey, An "obsequious" or fawning person, a toady, as in: "Full of servile compliance" from the Latin word obsequi of to comply with but in a fawning manner? fawning: "To seek favor by obsequious behavior"*, but my suggestion that his next class be in to understand fully this #664 out of his own manual resulting that there is no suggestion box there, and that if I don't like what the attorney is doing to take him to the PCC: which I said was a waste of time as Jim DeHart's Professional Conduct Committee is a Protection Racket for the attorneys, to cover-up what they have done! or don't do!!

* compare the word favor, with rigor juris, in Black's Law Dictionary.  I DEMAND or claim that my public servants don't fawn to me for favor, but are in STRICT compliance with the law, because when they are NOT then how in hell, or should I say: WHY should we do what they say when they are WRONG!? They are a bunch of hypocrites there within that entire U.S. Attorneys Office, and the N.H. Bar. Plus what is a "toady": but "A servile flatterer; a sycophant." So N.H. Bar Association: stop your flatter: To compliment excessively and often insincerely; to please or gratify the vanity of; to portray favorably.  I seek no favor, but rigor juris! from your members, and especially those who are my public servants. Your book of Attorneys in GOOD standing is a bunch of crap! See also for the word: sycophant: being "One who attempts to win favor or advance himself by flattering persons of influence: a servile self-seeker." From the Greek word: sukophantes "fig shower" and "accuser", now that's "very" interesting: what is a "fig- shower"?** So a sychophant is an accuser, from the word accuse: To charge (someone) with an error. Law. To bring charges against (someone) for a mis-deed. From the Latin word: accusare, to accuse, "call to account".  So Tom C: YOU are in "error", for these Four Freedom Keepers to counter-charge you as being wrong for your non or mis-deed of technically a deed as in the Registry of Deeds, but the word deed also meaning an act. So where is this act of the N.H. RSA Ch. 123:1 filing from 1-8-17 U.S. Constitution?  There is none, and so you are a phony! Not genuine, spurious, fake. Reference the spurious word for: not only counterfeit or false, but also: "lacking authenticity". So there you have it Tom C. you phony, and sycho- flunky fawning toady operating withOUT authority! Wise up!

-- Joseph S. Haas

** "fig-shower" over at http://www.google.com/ in quotes gets you to page one #1 there of: http://www.baldji.gr/aboutfigs.html See indented paragraph #5 from the top: "The word sycophant, meaning an informer, and one who seeks favors by flattering the wealthy, comes from the Greek 'to shower the fig.' As the valuable and sacred figs were stolen for export purposes, certain persons revealed the figs and accused the robbers; hence 'fig shower'."

[JosephSHaas]

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...

... Hey Keith: can you call there? like to request a Progress Report of WHEN Tom C. will get back to me in writing about his understanding of this #664. 

Update: Since in N.H.: Legal Remedies are to be free, complete and prompt* (Art. 14, N.H. Const. Part 1st & Bill of Rights) that has somehow changed into mere privileges revoked by these attorney/ public NON-servants!

* prompt = without delay
delay = postpone
post = after
pone = meal

I did just follow up my morning telephone calls to there again at 225-1552 with this during lunchtime call and was referred over to the voice mail of Linda Tomlinson, the blocking secretary for Colantuono, telling her voice recorded that I am still looking for an answer from him to this #664 that I've called to there about #__ times plus did put it in writing on his own form, and delivered in person back on October or November ___ 2007 @ __:_ o'clock a.m./p.m. to his office window clerk to deliver to him, that I still do not know whether it was delivered or trashed, or whatever.

Linda said to leave a message "or" to call her cell phone # 603: 496-8144 and that she "will" get back to you, but never does, as yet another liar in the bunch there! and so to call her back later this afternoon (after what? the snack time? as on snack time with candy bar by the vending machine) to see WHEN I can expect an answer to my request that he verify in writing of whether or not this "embraces courthouses" in #664 refers to the courthouse where he does business, and if so, whether or not it is in compliance with the law!

- - Joe

[JosephSHaas]

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...
14 Colantuono KNOWS about the fact that this court is in an unlawful position, as from it mentioned in his U.S. Attorney Manual #664, but fails to do anything about it!
....

Bill - I just sent you the scan of the 2-page letter of eleven (11) days [nine (9) business days] ago, the two pages reduced to one print-out at 64% for the http://www.danrileyld.blogspot.com if you'd like to post that there, and with any reply so far, that if none, the question being of WHEN the attorney plans to file the Motion for Discovery, and still if with no answer, then the Motion to Dismiss for his client?, that the others can rely on, and then Ed's attorney to file a Motion for a Mis-trial and/or Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the U.S. District Court out in __________, Oklahoma.  Let's say that the Motion for Discovery gets filed by the end of next week, Friday, December 21st as the last day of this Fall season, that means an answer has to be returned within ten (10) calendar days and so by December 31st, for the Motion to Dismiss put in like on Fri., January 4th, [before the Tuesday, January 8th group meeting of all four attorneys with all four inmates in one room] + another ten (10) days to Monday, January 14th, and when Judge Singal sees that there has been no objection, or one objection but with a bunch of B.S., then to like hold a hearing the next Monday, January 21st, the week before the scheduled start of the trial on Mon., Jan. 28th, for Singal to dismiss all the charges.

Here's a typing of a part of that letter:

"STANLEY W. NORKUNAS, ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW, 11 KEARNEY SQUARE, HOWE BUILDING, LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS 01852

TELEPHONE: (978) 454-7465   FAX: (978) 937-7753

ADMITTED TO PRACTICE: MASSACHUSETTS   NEW HAMPSHIRE   MAINE

Arnold H. Huftalen, Esquire, Assistant United States Attorney, 55 Pleasant Street, Concord, NH 03301

3 December 2007

RE: Jason Gerhard, United States v. Riley, Et Al  No. 07-189 GSZ

Dear Attorney Huftalen:

--In accordance with the local rules I am requesting from you the following information in regard to the above referenced case:

1. RSA 123-1 sets out a requirement for the federal government to obtain legal jurisdiction within the State of New Hampshire in '...that an accurate description and plan of the lands so owned and occupied, verified by the oath of some officer of the United States having knowledge of the facts, shall be filed with the secretary of this state;...' I am seeking a copy of any such documentation filed in regard to the establishment of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.

2. ...

3. ...

--If you are unable or do not intend to provide such information please notify me as soon as possible in order that I may file a motion with the Court to obtain these items.

Very truly yours,  Stanley W. Norkunas".

JSH

[LordBaltimore]

Joe,

Here's Bob's Order of Detention if you haven't seen it.

http://www.box.net/shared/static/ig8bbc0qjz.pdf

According to his co-conspirator Riley, whose several proffers were born out on the ground, Wolffe watched Riley and
Brown make pipe bombs and then offered to and did bring material for more pipe bombs.

Bottom line, don't trust Danny with your secrets.

[JosephSHaas]

1.) Danny's Appeal.

Bill - 

-- I did just call the N.H. Supreme Court, at 271-2646 and Donna Nadeau told me that his Motion to file an Amicus Curiae later due to his being in Max-lock up for a week's extension from the Dec. 26th Brief-ing deadline wanted was DENIED, as moot since he is already allowed the BRIEF, and that any third-party friend-of-the-court must request by motion with copies to both main parties that may be granted.

--So while looking up on the internet http://www.google.com search engine for "Larry Becraft" Huntsville Alabama, I found what, I guess, was (past tense), his telephone # 265-533-2535 in #5 of 5 on page one of one, as disconnected. But look in #4 there of the BRIEF already done!  at http://home.hiwaay.net/~becraft/ over to http://home.hiwaay.net/~becraft/FEDJurisdiction.html that I just printed out onto eight [8] pages at the 70% level, to copy and send to him and the others later this afternoon. Yet to read; ___.

2.) Ed's Habeas +/or The Freedom Four Dismissal.

--Plus see also #2 of the http://www.opc.org/OS/html/V4/4b.html website entitled: "Render to All What is Due Them, Part 2" by David H. Hagopian, as Attorney in Los Angeles, but like they say of practicing law, he has yet to make it to perfection, this October 1995 Report in The "Ordained Servant", Vol. 4, No. 4 filled with garbage from Robert Haldane in that he quotes "a tax is a debt", as just the opposite from that New Jersey* case for the word tax, in "Black's Law Dictionary" 5th Edition (c)1079 @ page 1307; but with some interesting info about WHO to tax, but the "strangers" from foreign lands, and not our own people, re: Matthew 17:24-27, and those phoros and tulos words for tribute and duties respectfully.

--And so with some extra time today, did call Attorney Jeff Dickson (bottom of the "Render" page) of P.O. Box 150124 of Tulsa, OK (918) 663-1490, but # disconnected, so did search for Oklahoma attorneys at Google and found at the http://attorneypages.com/lawyer-state_criminal-OK-Oklahoma_City.htm after the Civil Rights section, that same Jaye Mendros Law Firm at 1-866-490-0338 with Gina referring me over to Cindy Voil, 1-405-528-1285 (who I had a nice chat with about Ed's case, after talking with Jennifer too), but that although she just got her federal license to practice, she mostly does in-state and appeal criminal cases, and suggested I try FindLaw dot com, but one other one here first being: Atkins & Markoff at 1-866-451-9070 with a chat with Lothario who said that she'd call one of the attorneys to get back to me in about an hour, and that I could return the call to their main # 405-607-8757 Their website: http://www.oklahomacriminallawcenter.com/index.html?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=PPC&utm_campaign=Oklahoma+Criminal+Defense+Lawyers&source=yahoo&cd=1096044

--The suggestion being that WHEN either Danny wins his Habeas Corpus in February and/or The Motion to Dismiss the charges against the Four Freedom Keepers as unlawful on January __, 2008 by Judge Singal from Maine who can tell the N.H. Feds to comply with the law! THEN to have the paperwork in place for an immediate hearing of release for Ed in Oklahoma, and then Elaine too in Connecticut.  Maybe not needing this Okla. attorney and Conn. attorney to find (Andrew Napolitano in New Jersey*?)  IF McAuliffe does what's right in admitting this federal error, and the consequences upon the current victims, and declare an immediate mis-trial for Ed & Elaine, thus proving the Four Freedom Keepers as correctly asserting their "defensive" positions against an outlaw federal government gone running amok.

Yours truly, - - Joe

[JosephSHaas]

Joe,

Here's Bob's Order of Detention if you haven't seen it.

http://www.box.net/shared/static/ig8bbc0qjz.pdf

According to his co-conspirator Riley, whose several proffers were born out on the ground, Wolffe watched Riley and
Brown make pipe bombs and then offered to and did bring material for more pipe bombs.

Bottom line, don't trust Danny with your secrets.

Thanks Richard,

For this 5-page Order, and especially where Muirhead used the phrase of: "bizarre* views'.  I wonder what he'll have to say when Singal tells the N.H. court to wise up! 

* bizarre = unconventional, as in what? against the standard operating procedures of to ignore their oaths of office to file these papers!? [N.H. RSA 123:1 from 1-8-17 U.S. Const.] I should hope so to be in such a bizarre situation, because to be in contempt of court to this corrupt court is to be in honor of the Constitution of the United States of America.  "God save the Queen" and Defender of the Faithful, as Sonny would say.

[JosephSHaas]

...: Atkins & Markoff at 1-866-451-9070 with a chat with Lothario who said that she'd call one of the attorneys to get back to me in about an hour, and that I could return the call to their main # 405-607-8757 Their website: http://www.oklahomacriminallawcenter.com/index.html?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=PPC&utm_campaign=Oklahoma+Criminal+Defense+Lawyers&source=yahoo&cd=1096044

...

It looks like my packet of mail won't be going out to them tonight for delivery tomorrow, but maybe for Saturday postmark, and Monday delivery to the four plus E&E maybe on Wednesday of next week on the sixth day** BEFORE Christmas as in that other song (for some songwriter to write about here, as we go before #___ more judges)  Me remembering something about somebody who always started his mailings on Monday morning so that it would never be transported on a Sunday when even the postal workers should take off as their day of rest too, being the sabbath, day-of-rest, for the heart actually I read years ago for the technical meaning of the word. So maybe a Monday mailing. MMM, as in 3M.

Here's what kept me busy this afternoon too, in that I did call Lothario back at the 607 # and she said that she did talk with Tommy, the head of the Criminal Bureau there, and that he would like to talk with me about the case. I asked: when? She said now; and gave me his cell phone # 405: 808- _____ (on the printout to the others by mail), and we had a nice chat too, of that as soon as Ed files the paperwork with the Federal Court "and" sets it up for a hearing on his Petition for an Habeas Corpus, that Tommy will file his appearance and argue the case, since he heard about this Louisiana case of similar situation (the one that Jason's lawyer told him about the crime on federal soil, but because the feds did not file the paperwork with the state governor's office, that it was a state, not federal crime), and so Tommy would like to get credit for being the first in another state to use what Attorney Larry Becraft has posted at his excellent website of these single and double-filing states. The word getting around somehow on this state of New Hampshire maybe being the second state to use this, and so Oklahoma third, but still O.K. with him and even better, as that would make his job that much easier.

So Ed: Here's a photocopy of the http://www.okwd.uscourts.gov/ print-out* for you to send a $5.00 Money Order by Rule #___ to start the docket #_________ of your Petition for an Habeas Corpus Petition, citing the non-jurisdiction of N.H. to have wrongfully tried and sentenced you in violation of Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 17, U.S. Constitution, since the Feds FAILed to file the N.H. RSA Ch. 123:1 papers, and that as soon as you get a case # and/or hearing date, that this attorney "will" then file his appearance for you, because I "will" send him the $x,xxx for this service.

Yours truly, - - Joe

*U.S. District Court
Western District of Oklahoma
200 NW 4th Street
-Room 1210
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
(405) 609-5000

** to read: http://www.cresourcei.org/cy12days.html
for the Twelve Days OF Christmas, beginning Dec. 26th
to Jan. 6th, the Epiphany, or Three Kings Day.

[keith in RI]

HAS ANOTHER ONE OF THE BROWNS SUPPORTERS BEEN TAKEN DOWN??

some of you may remember a few days back i posted about a guy that went by the name "old buck" who camped out on the browns property in his camper for about 6 weeks this summer. he informed the marshalls and police he was there but was unarmed and would stay that way. he last posted through his myspace saying that the federal prosecutors had contacted his lawyer to have him come in and speak to them. he asked if they were offering "immunity" they said no the lawyer said no back. jim aka:old buck said he wouldnt speak even with immunity because he didnt do anything wrong! they told his lawyer , who wrote a book that ron paul wrote the forward to, that if he didnt speak to them they are going to do everything they can to indict him. he said so indict me! \

  today i try to contact jim through his myspace page and it has been hijacked by the same thugs that hijacked ed and elaines time2makeastand website. it looks identical and the only "friend" is ed and elaines old page now labeled as "showing ed and elaine brown supporters the law" jims old myspace is myspace.com/twostraws    see for yourself. he is now unreachable. if anyone has seen or heard from jim please let us know. if he has been arrested we would like to verify his safety.

  we do not know if he has been arrested or how long the page has been taken over for but if history is a guide ed and elaines page wasnt hijacked until several days after their arrest.

[armlaw]

....

...
14 Colantuono KNOWS about the fact that this court is in an unlawful position, as from it mentioned in his U.S. Attorney Manual #664, but fails to do anything about it!
....

Bill - I just sent you the scan of the 2-page letter of eleven (11) days [nine (9) business days] ago, the two pages reduced to one print-out at 64% for the http://www.danrileyld.blogspot.com if you'd like to post that there, and with any reply so far, that if none, the question being of WHEN the attorney plans to file the Motion for Discovery, and still if with no answer, then the Motion to Dismiss for his client?, that the others can rely on, and then Ed's attorney to file a Motion for a Mis-trial and/or Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the U.S. District Court out in __________, Oklahoma.  Let's say that the Motion for Discovery gets filed by the end of next week, Friday, December 21st as the last day of this Fall season, that means an answer has to be returned within ten (10) calendar days and so by December 31st, for the Motion to Dismiss put in like on Fri., January 4th, [before the Tuesday, January 8th group meeting of all four attorneys with all four inmates in one room] + another ten (10) days to Monday, January 14th, and when Judge Singal sees that there has been no objection, or one objection but with a bunch of B.S., then to like hold a hearing the next Monday, January 21st, the week before the scheduled start of the trial on Mon., Jan. 28th, for Singal to dismiss all the charges.

Here's a typing of a part of that letter:

"STANLEY W. NORKUNAS, ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW, 11 KEARNEY SQUARE, HOWE BUILDING, LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS 01852

TELEPHONE: (978) 454-7465   FAX: (978) 937-7753

ADMITTED TO PRACTICE: MASSACHUSETTS   NEW HAMPSHIRE   MAINE

Arnold H. Huftalen, Esquire, Assistant United States Attorney, 55 Pleasant Street, Concord, NH 03301

3 December 2007

RE: Jason Gerhard, United States v. Riley, Et Al  No. 07-189 GSZ

Dear Attorney Huftalen:

--In accordance with the local rules I am requesting from you the following information in regard to the above referenced case:

1. RSA 123-1 sets out a requirement for the federal government to obtain legal jurisdiction within the State of New Hampshire in '...that an accurate description and plan of the lands so owned and occupied, verified by the oath of some officer of the United States having knowledge of the facts, shall be filed with the secretary of this state;...' I am seeking a copy of any such documentation filed in regard to the establishment of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.

2. ...

3. ...

--If you are unable or do not intend to provide such information please notify me as soon as possible in order that I may file a motion with the Court to obtain these items.

Very truly yours,  Stanley W. Norkunas".

JSH

Joe...This just arrived from another list that shares info and you may find some good case law to use....




Cases Jurisdictional Failings
Jurisdictional Failings

"Absent required colloquy by magistrate judge, language printed on consent form was not sufficient to inform defendant of his rights under statute allowing defendant charged with misdemeanor to waive trial before district judge and to elect trial before magistrate judge, where the relevant portion of the consent form was three sentences long, and only one of the sentences addressed defendant's right to an Article III judge." U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, sec. 1 etseq; 18 U.S.C.A. sec 3401(b); FRCrP 58(b)(2), (b)(3)(A), 18 U.S.C.A. U.S. v. Gochis 196 F.R.D. 519 (2000)

"Court may always raise question of subject matter jurisdiction on appeal and in courts below." U,S. v. Prestenbach, 230 F.3d 780 (2000)

"Courts can always consider questions as to subject matter jurisdiction whenever raised and even sua sponte." U.S. v. White, 139 F.3d 998 cert den 119 S.Ct 343, 525 U.S. 393, 142 L.Ed.2d 283 (1998)

"Jurisdiction over a defendant requires both personal and subject matter jurisdiction." Boles v. State, 717 So.2d 877 (1998)

"Courts acquire authority to adjudicate matter if they have both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction." McKinney's CPL v. sec. 1.20 subd. 9. -- People v. Marzban, 660 N.Y.S.2d 808, 172 Misc.2d 987 (1997)
"Subject matter jurisdiction is determined from pleadings." Hall v. State, 933 S.W.2d 363, 326 Ark. 318, 326 Ark. 823 rehearing denied (1996)

"In its most fundamental or strict sense, 'jurisdiction' means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties, but the term may also refer to the situation where a court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter has no power to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites; action 'in excess of jurisdiction' by a court that has jurisdiction in a fundamental sense is not void, but only voidable." People v. Burnett, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 71 Cal.App 151 (1999)

"Judgment made when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void." Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18, transfer denied 741 N.E.2d 1247 (2000)

"In a criminal action, the trial court must not only have jurisdiction over the offense charged, but over the question which the judgment presumes to decide." State v. Kraushaar, 957 P.2d 1106, 264 Kan. 667 "Information is the only vehicle by which a court obtains and has limits placed on its jurisdiction." -Id (1998)

"Court lacked jurisdiction over defendant charged with possession of loaded firearm such as would enable it to entertain defendant's motion to dismiss indictment on ground that diplomatic immunity created legal impediment to his conviction, where defendant failed to appear in court to be arraigned on accusatory instrument." -Id

"In legal prosecution, all legal requisites must be complied with to confer jurisdiction on the court in criminal matters, as district attorney cannot confer jurisdiction by will alone." People v. Page, 667 N.Y.S.2d 689, 177 Misc.2d 448 (1998)
Where the court is without jurisdiction, it has no authority to do anything other than to dismiss the case." Fontenot v. State, 932 S.W.2d 185 "Judicial action without jurisdiction is void."-Id (1996)

"Jurisdiction means the power of a court to hear and determine a cause, which power is conferred by a constitution or a statute, or both." Penn v. Com. 528 S.E.2d 179, 32 Va.App. 422 (2000)
"A court cannot acquire jurisdiction to try a person for an act made criminal only by an unconstitutional law, and thus, an offense created by an unconstitutional statute, is no longer a crime and a conviction under such statute cannot be a legal cause for imprisonment." State v. Benzel, 583 N.W.2d 434, 220 Wis.2d 588 (1998)

"Jurisdiction is determined solely from face of information or indictment." State v. Lainez, 771 So.2d 617, and Snyder v. State 715 So.2d 367, review denied 727 So.2d 911 (2000)

"As a prerequisite for presiding over a case , a court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of an offense and of the person of the defendant; that is, two jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied before a court has authority to hear and determine a particular cause of action." Malone v. Com., 30 S.W.3d 180 (2000)

"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable defect which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings." State v. LaPier, 961 P.2d 1274, 289 Mont. 392, 1998 MT 174 (1998)
"Ruling made in absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a nullity." State v. Dvorak, 574 N.W.2d 492, 254 Neb. 87 (1998)

"If the trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction of defendants case, conviction and sentence would be void ab initio." State v. Swiger, 708 N.E.2d 1033, 125 Ohio.App.3d 456, dismissed, appeal not allowed, 694 N.E.2d 75, 82 Ohio St.3d 1411 (1998)

"Before a court may exercise judicial power to hear and determine a criminal prosecution, that court must possess three types of jursdiction: jurisdiction over the defendant, jurisdiction over the alleged crime, and territorial jurisdiction." Const. Art. 1 sec. 9, State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111 (1999)
"Without jurisdiction, criminal proceedings are a nullity." State v. Inglin, 592 N.W.2d 666, 274 Wis.2d 764 (1999)

"Criminal subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to inquire into charged crime, to apply applicable law, and to declare punishment." W.S.A. Const. Art. 7, sec. 8; W.S.A. 753.03, State v. West, 571 N.W.2d 196, 214 Wis.2d 468 , review denied 579 N.W.2d 44, 216 Wis.2d 612 (1997)

"Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction to render final judgments on felony charges." Muhammad v. State, 998 S.W.2d 763, 67 Ark.App 262 (1999)

"Circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over all misdemeanors which arise out of the same circumstances as a felony also charged." State v. Coble, 704 So.2d 197 (1998)

"Circuit court has no jurisdiction to try misdemeanors in the absence of a felony." Short v. State 767 So.2d 575 (2000)

"State Constitution establishes exclusive jurisdiction over felony cases in the superior court." State v. Sterling, 535 S.E.2d 329, 244 Ga.App. 328 (2000)

"There was no merit to defendant's contention that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him because his crime did not take place on federally owned land and the 10th Amendment reserved drug prosecutions such as his to the states." U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 10, Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, sec. 401(a), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. secs 841(a), 846. U.S. v. Deering 179 F.3d 592, cert. den. 120 S.Ct 361, 528 U.S. 945, 145 L.Ed.2d 283 (1999)

"Whether or not the government takes out the interstate commerce element of an offense has no effect on the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. U.S. v. Degan, 229 F.3d 553, 2000 Fed.App 367P. (2000)

"Federal criminal jurisdiction is limited to cases involving activities specifically made criminal by either Federal Constitution or Congress." U.S. v. Corona, 934 F.Supp. 740, affirmed in part 108 F.3d 565 (1996)

"Under 'effects doctrine,' a sovereign only possesses jurisdiction to prosecute a crime when, inter alia, the effect within the territory is substantial." U.S. v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, cert. den. 119 S.Ct 1026, 525 U.S. 1138, 143 L.Ed.2d 37 (1998)

"Under the theory of 'territorial jurisdiction,' jurisdiction to subject the accused to criminal prosecution rests in the courts of the state in which the crime is committed." State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, denial of post conviction relief confirmed 2000 WL 1827164 (1996)

"Territorial jurisdiction is an essential element of a crime, and a state is required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt." -Id

"Territorial jurisdiction" is question of state's power to prosecute and punish accused for crime and must be proven beyond reasonable doubt." People v. al-Ladkani, 647 N.Y.S.2d 666, 169 Misc.2d 720 (1996)

"Jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction in civil matters has no bearing on question whether a person may be brought to a State and tried there for crimes under that State's laws." In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 428 Mass. 842 (1999)

"Where the law provides method for acquiring jurisdiction over defendant in criminal action, as by indictment of grand jury, that method must be strictly pursued to acquire jurisdiction." People v. Page, 677 N.Y.S.2d 689, 177 Misc.2d 448 (1998)

"If defendant enters plea of not guilty and is in court on day of trial, the court has jurisdiction over his person." State v. Waters, 971 P.2d 538, 93 Wash.App 969 (1999)

"Subject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred on a federal court by stipulation, estoppel, or waiver." U.S. v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666. (1999)

"Power of courts to proceed, i.e., their jurisdiction over the subject matter, cannot be conferred by mere act of litigant, whether it amounts to consent, waiver, or estoppel, and hence the lack od such jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal." People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 52 Cal.App.4th 233 (1997)

"Jurisdiction can not be conferred to court by agreement of parties." Akins v. State, 691 So.2d 587 (1997)

"Lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent or waived by entry of a guilty plea; doctrine of waiver cannot be effective when court lacks jurisdiction over the case itself." Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185 rehearing denied , review dismissed 728 So.2d 205 (1998)
"Party cannot stipulate to jurisdiction when court lacks it." Sterling v. State, 682 So.2d 694 (1996)

"Where no cognizable crime is charged, the court lacks fundamental subject matter jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction, i.e. it is powerless in such circumstances to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment for an offense." Robinson v. State, 728 A.2d 698, 353 Md. 683 (1999)

"Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent; nor may subject matter jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of parties." State v. Trevino, 556 N.W.2d 638, 251 Neb. 344 (1996)

"Appearance ticket is not accusatory instrument and its filing does not confer jurisdiction over defendant." People v. Gabbay, 670 N.Y.S.2d 962, 175 Misc.2d 421 appeal denied 678 N.Y.S.2d 26, 92 N.Y.2d 879, 700 N.E.2d 564 (1997)

"Service of an appearance ticket on an accused does not confer personal or subject matter jurisdiction upon a criminal court." People v. Giusti, 673 N.Y.S.2d 824, 176 Misc.2d 377 (1998)

"No valid conviction can occur if the charging instrument is void." State v. Wilson, 6 S.W.3d 504 (1998)
"Threshold issue of whether court has jurisdiction to resolve pending controversy is fundamental and cannot be ignored; accordingly, court may sua sponte address issue, as subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement of parties, but must be vested in court by constitution or statute." State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, on remand 1997 WL334879. (1996)

"While superior court lacks authority to try a defendant for a felony charged by information with an offense not previously subjected to a preliminary hearing , violation of this limitation on the superior court's power would constitute action in excess of jurisdiction, waivable error, and not non-waivable subject matter jurisdiction." People v. Burnett, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 71 Cal.App.4th 151 (1999)

"Trial court acts without jurisdiction when it acts without inherent or common law authority, nor any authority by statute or rule." State v. Rodriguez, 725 A.2d 635, 125 Md.App 428, cert den 731 A.2d 971, 354 Md. 573 (1999)

"Criminal law magistrates have no power of their own and are unable to enforce any ruling." V.T.C.A., Government Code sec. 54.651 et seq., Davis v. State, 956 S.W.2d 555 (1997)

"A court's authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over a case may be restricted by Filure to comply with statutory requirements that are mandatory in nature and, thus, are prerequisite to court's lawful exercise of that jurisdiction." Moore v. Com., 527 S.E.2d 406, 259 Va. 431 (2000)

"Only Congress can make an act a crime, affix punishment to it, and declare court that shall have jurisdiction." U.S. v. Beckford, 966 F.Supp. 1415 (1997)



United States v Guest 383 U S 745  1966  Right to Travel

United States v Guest, 383 U S 745, March 28, 1966
HARLAN, J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
383 U.S. 745
United States v. Guest
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

No. 65 Argued: November 9, 1965 --- Decided: March 28, 1966

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I and II [n1] of the Court's opinion, but I cannot subscribe to Part III in its full sweep. To the extent that it is there held that 18 U.S.C.  ? 241 (1964 ed.) reaches conspiracies, embracing only the action of [p763] private persons, to obstruct or otherwise interfere with the right of citizens freely to engage in interstate travel, I am constrained to dissent. On the other hand, I agree that ? 241 does embrace state interference with such interstate travel, and I therefore consider that this aspect of the indictment is sustainable on the reasoning of Part II of the Court's opinion.

This right to travel must be found in the Constitution itself. This is so because ? 241 covers only conspiracies to interfere with any citizen in the "free exercise or enjoyment" of a right or privilege "secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States," and no "right to travel" can be found in ? 241 or in any other law of the United States. My disagreement with this phase of the Court's opinion lies in this: while past cases do indeed establish that there is a constitutional "right to travel" between States free from unreasonable governmental interference, today's decision is the first to hold that such movement is also protected against private interference, and, depending on the constitutional source of the right, I think it either unwise or impermissible so to read the Constitution.

Preliminarily, nothing in the Constitution expressly secures the right to travel. In contrast, the Articles of Confederation provided in Art. IV:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States, and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively. . . [p764]
This right to "free ingress and regress" was eliminated from the draft of the Constitution without discussion even though the main objective of the Convention was to create a stronger union. It has been assumed that the clause was dropped because it was so obviously an essential part of our federal structure that it was necessarily subsumed under more general clauses of the Constitution. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294. I propose to examine the several asserted constitutional bases for the right to travel, and the scope of its protection in relation to each source.

I

Because of the close proximity of the right of ingress and regress to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation, it has long been declared that the right is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship under the Constitution. In the influential opinion of Mr. Justice Washington on circuit, Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.C.C. 371 (1825), the court addressed itself to the question -- "what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?" Id. at 380. Corfield was concerned with a New Jersey statute restricting to state citizens the right to rake for oysters, a statute which the court upheld. In analyzing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, ? 2, the court stated that it confined "these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental," and listed among them

The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise. . . .
Id. at 380-381.

The dictum in Corfield was given general approval in the first opinion of this Court to deal directly with the right of free movement, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, [p765] which struck down a Nevada statute taxing persons leaving the State. It is first noteworthy that, in his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Clifford asserted that he would hold the statute void exclusively on commerce grounds, for he was clear "that the State legislature cannot impose any such burden upon commerce among the several States." 6 Wall. at 49. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, however, eschewed reliance on the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause and looked rather to the nature of the federal union:

The people of these United States constitute one nation. . . . This government has necessarily a capital established by law. . . . That government has a right to call to this point any or all of its citizens to aid in its service. . . . The government, also, has its offices of secondary importance in all other parts of the country. On the sea-coasts and on the rivers, it has its ports of entry. In the interior, it has its land offices, its revenue offices, and its sub-treasuries. In all these, it demands the services of its citizens, and is entitled to bring them to those points from all quarters of the nation, and no power can exist in a State to obstruct this right that would not enable it to defeat the purposes for which the government was established.

6 Wall. at 43-44. Accompanying this need of the Federal Government, the Court found a correlative right of the citizen to move unimpeded throughout the land:
He has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are [p766] conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it.

6 Wall. at 44. The focus of that opinion, very clearly, was thus on impediments by the States on free movement by citizens. This is emphasized subsequently when Mr. Justice Miller asserts that this approach is "neither novel nor unsupported by authority," because it is, fundamentally, a question of the exercise of a State's taxing power to obstruct the functions of the Federal Government:
[T]he right of the States in this mode to impede or embarrass the constitutional operations of that government, or the rights which its citizens hold under it, has been uniformly denied.
6 Wall. at 44-45.

Later cases, alluding to privileges and immunities, have in dicta included the right to free movement. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180; Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78.

Although the right to travel thus has respectable precedent to support its status as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship, it is important to note that those cases all dealt with the right of travel simply as affected by oppressive state action. Only one prior case in this Court, United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, was argued precisely in terms of a right to free movement, as against interference by private individuals. There, the Government alleged a conspiracy under the predecessor of ? 241 against the perpetrators of the notorious Bisbee Deportations. [n2] The case was argued straightforwardly in terms of whether the right to free ingress and [p767] egress, admitted by both parties to be a right of national citizenship, was constitutionally guaranteed against private conspiracies. The Brief for the Defendants in Error, whose counsel was Charles Evans Hughes, later Chief Justice of the United States, gives as one of its main points:
So far as there is a right pertaining to Federal citizenship to have free ingress or egress with respect to the several States, the right is essentially one of protection against the action of the States themselves and of those acting under their authority.

Brief, at p. i. The Court, with one dissent, accepted this interpretation of the right of unrestricted interstate movement, observing that Crandall v. Nevada, supra, was inapplicable because, inter alia, it dealt with state action. 254 U.S. at 299. More recent cases discussing or applying the right to interstate travel have always been in the context of oppressive state action. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, and other cases discussed infra. [n3]

It is accordingly apparent that the right to unimpeded interstate travel, regarded as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship, was historically seen as a method of breaking down state provincialism, and facilitating the creation of a true federal union. In the one case in which a private conspiracy to obstruct such movement was heretofore presented to this Court, the predecessor of the very statute we apply today was held not to encompass such a right.

II

A second possible constitutional basis for the right to move among the States without interference is the Commerce Clause. When Mr. Justice Washington articulated [p768] the right in Corfield, it was in the context of a state statute impeding economic activity by outsiders, and he cast his statement in economic terms. 4 Wash. C. C., at 380-381. The two concurring Justices in Crandall v. Nevada, supra, rested solely on the commerce argument, indicating again the close connection between freedom of commerce and travel as principles of our federal union. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, the Court held squarely that the right to unimpeded movement of persons is guaranteed against oppressive state legislation by the Commerce Clause, and declared unconstitutional a California statute restricting the entry of indigents into that State.

Application of the Commerce Clause to this area has the advantage of supplying a longer tradition of case law and more refined principles of adjudication. States do have rights of taxation and quarantine, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. at 184 (concurring opinion), which must be weighed against the general right of free movement, and Commerce Clause adjudication has traditionally been the means of reconciling these interests. Yet this approach to the right to travel, like that found in the privileges and immunities cases, is concerned with the interrelation of state and federal power, not -- with an exception to be dealt with in a moment -- with private interference.
The case of In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, may be thought to raise some doubts as to this proposition. There, the United States sought to enjoin Debs and members of his union from continuing to obstruct -- by means of a strike -- interstate commerce and the passage of the mails. The Court held that Congress and the Executive could certainly act to keep the channels of interstate commerce open, and that a court of equity had no less power to enjoin what amounted to a public nuisance. It might [p769] be argued that to the extent Debs permits the Federal Government to obtain an injunction against the private conspiracy alleged in the present indictment, [n4] the criminal statute should be applicable as well on the ground that the governmental interest in both cases is the same, namely to vindicate the underlying policy of the Commerce Clause. However, ? 241 is not directed toward the vindication of governmental interests; it requires a private right under federal law. No such right can be found in Debs, which stands simply for the proposition that the Commerce Clause gives the Federal Government standing to sue on a basis similar to that of private individuals under nuisance law. The substantive rights of private persons to enjoin such impediments, of course, devolve from state, not federal, law; any seemingly inconsistent discussion in Debs would appear substantially vitiated by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64.

I cannot find in any of this past case law any solid support for a conclusion that the Commerce Clause embraces a right to be free from private interference. And the Court's opinion here makes no such suggestion.

III

One other possible source for the right to travel should be mentioned. Professor Chafee, in his thoughtful study, "Freedom of Movement," [n5] finds both the privileges and immunities approach and the Commerce Clause approach unsatisfactory. After a thorough review of the history [p770] and cases dealing with the question, he concludes that this "valuable human right," id. at 209, is best seen in due process terms:

Already, in several decisions, the Court has used the Due Process Clause to safeguard the right of the members of any race to reside where they please inside a state, regardless of ordinances and injunctions. Why is not this clause equally available to assure the right to live in any state one desires? And unreasonable restraints by the national government on mobility can be upset by the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment. . . . Thus, the "liberty" of all human beings which cannot be taken away without due process of law includes liberty of speech, press, assembly, religion, and also liberty of movement.
Id. at 192-193.

This due process approach to the right to unimpeded movement has been endorsed by this Court. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116"]357 U.S. 116, the Court asserted that "The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment," id. at 125, citing Crandall v. Nevada, supra, and Edwards v. California, supra. It is true that the holding in that case turned essentially on statutory grounds. However, in 357 U.S. 116, the Court asserted that "The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment," id. at 125, citing Crandall v. Nevada, supra, and Edwards v. California, supra. It is true that the holding in that case turned essentially on statutory grounds. However, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, the Court, applying this constitutional doctrine, struck down a federal statute forbidding members of Communist organizations to obtain passports. Both the majority and dissenting opinions affirmed the principle that the right to travel is an aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.

Viewing the right to travel in due process terms, of course, would clearly make it inapplicable to the present case, for due process speaks only to governmental action [p771 ]

IV

This survey of the various bases for rounding the "right to travel" is conclusive only to the extent of showing that there has never been an acknowledged constitutional right to be free from private interference, and that the right in question has traditionally been seen and applied, whatever the constitutional underpinning asserted, only against governmental impediments. The right involved being as nebulous as it is, however, it is necessary to consider it in terms of policy as well as precedent.

As a general proposition, it seems to me very dubious that the Constitution was intended to create certain rights of private individuals as against other private individuals. The Constitutional Convention was called to establish a nation, not to reform the common law. Even the Bill of Rights, designed to protect personal liberties, was directed at rights against governmental authority, not other individuals. It is true that there is a very narrow range of rights against individuals which have been read into the Constitution. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, the Court held that implicit in the Constitution is the right of citizens to be free of private interference in federal elections. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, extended this coverage to primaries. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, applied the predecessor of ? 241 to a conspiracy to injure someone in the custody of a United States marshal; the case has been read as dealing with a privilege and immunity of citizenship, but it would seem to have depended as well on extrapolations from statutory provisions providing for supervision of prisoners. The Court in In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, extending Logan, supra, declared that there was a right of federal citizenship to inform federal officials of violations of federal law. See also United [p772] States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, which announced in dicta a federal right to assemble to petition the Congress for a redress of grievances.

Whatever the validity of these cases on their own terms, they are hardly persuasive authorities for adding to the collection of privileges and immunities the right to be free of private impediments to travel. The cases just discussed are narrow, and are essentially concerned with the vindication of important relationships with the Federal Government voting in federal elections, involvement in federal law enforcement, communicating with the Federal Government. The present case stands on a considerably different footing.

It is arguable that the same considerations which led the Court on numerous occasions to find a right of free movement against oppressive state action now justify a similar result with respect to private impediments. Crandall v. Nevada, supra, spoke of the need to travel to the capital, to serve and consult with the offices of government. A basic reason for the formation of this Nation was to facilitate commercial intercourse; intellectual, cultural, scientific, social, and political interests are likewise served by free movement. Surely these interests can be impeded by private vigilantes as well as by state action. Although this argument is not without force, I do not think it is particularly persuasive. There is a difference in power between States and private groups so great that analogies between the two tend to be misleading. If the State obstructs free intercourse of goods, people, or ideas, the bonds of the union are threatened; if a private group effectively stops such communication, there is, at most, a temporary breakdown of law and order, to be remedied by the exercise of state authority or by appropriate federal legislation.

To decline to find a constitutional right of the nature asserted here does not render the Federal Government [p773] helpless. As to interstate commerce by railroads, federal law already provides remedies for "undue or unreasonable prejudice," 24 Stat. 380, as amended,49  U.S.C.  ? 3(1) (1964 ed.), which has been held to apply to racial discrimination. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816.

A similar statute applies to motor carriers, 49 Stat. 558, as amended, 49 U.S.C. ? 316(d) (1964 ed.), and to air carriers, 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. ? 1374(b) (1964 ed.). See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S.  454; Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, deals with other types of obstructions to interstate commerce. Indeed, under the Court's present holding, it is arguable that any conspiracy to discriminate in public accommodations having the effect of impeding interstate commerce could be reached under ? 241, unaided by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because Congress has wide authority to legislate in this area, it seems unnecessary -- if prudential grounds are of any relevance, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.  186, 258-259 (CLARK, J., concurring) -- to strain to find a dubious constitutional right.

V

If I have succeeded in showing anything in this constitutional exercise, it is that, until today, there was no federal right to be free from private interference with interstate transit, and very little reason for creating one. Although the Court has ostensibly only "discovered" this private right in the Constitution and then applied ? 241 mechanically to punish those who conspire to threaten it, it should be recognized that what the Court has in effect done is to use this all-encompassing criminal statute to fashion federal common law crimes, forbidden to the federal judiciary since the 1812 decision in United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32. My Brother DOUGLAS, dissenting in United States v. Classic, supra, [p774] noted well the dangers of the indiscriminate application of the predecessor of ? 241:
It is not enough for us to find in the vague penumbra of a statute some offense about which Congress could have legislated, and then to particularize it as a crime because it is highly offensive.
313 U.S. at 331-332.

I do not gainsay that the immunities and commerce provisions of the Constitution leave the way open for the finding of this "private" constitutional right, since they do not speak solely in terms of governmental action. Nevertheless, I think it wrong to sustain a criminal indictment on such an uncertain ground. To do so subjects ? 241 to serious challenge on the score of vagueness, and serves in effect to place this Court in the position of making criminal law under the name of constitutional interpretation. It is difficult to subdue misgivings about the potentialities of this decision.

I would sustain this aspect of the indictment only on the premise that it sufficiently alleges state interference with interstate travel, and on no other ground.
1. The action of three of the Justices who join the Court's opinion in nonetheless cursorily pronouncing themselves on the far-reaching constitutional questions deliberately not reached in Part II seems to me, to say the very least, extraordinary.
2. For a discussion of the deportations, see The President's Mediation Comm'n, Report on the Bisbee Deportations (November 6, 1917).
3. The Court's reliance on United States v. Moore, 129 F. 630, is misplaced. That case held only that it was not a privilege or immunity to organize labor unions. The reference to "the right to pass from one state to any other" was purely incidental dictum.
4. It is not even clear that an equity court would enjoin a conspiracy of the kind alleged here, for traditionally equity will not enjoin a crime. See Developments in the Law -- Injunctions, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 994, 1013-1018 (1965).
5. In Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, at 162 (1956).



Cases My Right of Defense Against Unlawful Arrest
MY RIGHT OF DEFENSE AGAINST
UNLAWFUL ARREST
LAWFUL CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE

"Citizens may resist unlawful arrest to the point of taking an arresting officer's life if necessary." Plummer v. State, 136 Ind. 306. This premise was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case: John Bad Elk v. U.S., 177 U.S. 529. The Court stated:

"Where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer had no right. What may be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed."

"An arrest made with a defective warrant, or one issued without affidavit, or one that fails to allege a crime is within jurisdiction, and one who is being arrested, may resist arrest and break away. if the arresting officer is killed by one who is so resisting, the killing will be no more than an involuntary manslaughter." Housh v. People, 75 111. 491; reaffirmed and quoted in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452; State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio 349; State v Rousseau, 241 P. 2d 447; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621.
"When a person, being without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self defense, his assailant is killed, he is justified." Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 1.

"These principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully uses such force and violence." Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. I; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.
"An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery." (State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260).

"Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person attempting the arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force, as in self- defense." (State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 100).

"One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is being assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus it is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody, without resistance." (Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910).

"Story affirmed the right of self-defense by persons held illegally. In his own writings, he had admitted that 'a situation could arise in which the checks-and-balances principle ceased to work and the various branches of government concurred in a gross usurpation.' There would be no usual remedy by changing the law or passing an amendment to the Constitution, should the oppressed party be a minority. Story concluded, 'If there be any remedy at all ... it is a remedy never provided for by human institutions.' That was the `ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply force against ruinous injustice.'" (From Mutiny on the Amistad by Howard Jones, Oxford University Press, 1987, an account of the reading of the decision in the case by Justice Joseph Story of the Supreme Court.

As for grounds for arrest: "The carrying of arms in a quiet, peaceable, and orderly manner, concealed on or about the person, is not a breach of the peace. Nor does such an act of itself, lead to a breach of the peace." (Wharton's Criminal and Civil Procedure, 12th Ed., Vol.2: Judy v. Lashley, 5 W. Va. 628, 41 S.E. 197)

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[JosephSHaas]

....

...
14 Colantuono KNOWS about the fact that this court is in an unlawful position, as from it mentioned in his U.S. Attorney Manual #664, but fails to do anything about it!
....

Bill - I just sent you the scan of the 2-page letter of eleven (11) days [nine (9) business days] ago, the two pages reduced to one print-out at 64% for the http://www.danrileyld.blogspot.com if you'd like to post that there, and with any reply so far, that if none, the question being of WHEN the attorney plans to file the Motion for Discovery, and still if with no answer, then the Motion to Dismiss for his client?, that the others can rely on, and then Ed's attorney to file a Motion for a Mis-trial and/or Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the U.S. District Court out in __________, Oklahoma.  Let's say that the Motion for Discovery gets filed by the end of next week, Friday, December 21st as the last day of this Fall season, that means an answer has to be returned within ten (10) calendar days and so by December 31st, for the Motion to Dismiss put in like on Fri., January 4th, [before the Tuesday, January 8th group meeting of all four attorneys with all four inmates in one room] + another ten (10) days to Monday, January 14th, and when Judge Singal sees that there has been no objection, or one objection but with a bunch of B.S., then to like hold a hearing the next Monday, January 21st, the week before the scheduled start of the trial on Mon., Jan. 28th, for Singal to dismiss all the charges.

Here's a typing of a part of that letter:

"STANLEY W. NORKUNAS, ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW, 11 KEARNEY SQUARE, HOWE BUILDING, LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS 01852

TELEPHONE: (978) 454-7465   FAX: (978) 937-7753

ADMITTED TO PRACTICE: MASSACHUSETTS   NEW HAMPSHIRE   MAINE

Arnold H. Huftalen, Esquire, Assistant United States Attorney, 55 Pleasant Street, Concord, NH 03301

3 December 2007

RE: Jason Gerhard, United States v. Riley, Et Al  No. 07-189 GSZ

Dear Attorney Huftalen:

--In accordance with the local rules I am requesting from you the following information in regard to the above referenced case:

1. RSA 123-1 sets out a requirement for the federal government to obtain legal jurisdiction within the State of New Hampshire in '...that an accurate description and plan of the lands so owned and occupied, verified by the oath of some officer of the United States having knowledge of the facts, shall be filed with the secretary of this state;...' I am seeking a copy of any such documentation filed in regard to the establishment of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.

2. ...

3. ...

--If you are unable or do not intend to provide such information please notify me as soon as possible in order that I may file a motion with the Court to obtain these items.

Very truly yours,  Stanley W. Norkunas".

JSH

Joe...This just arrived from another list that shares info and you may find some good case law to use....




Cases Jurisdictional Failings
Jurisdictional Failings

"Absent required colloquy by magistrate judge, language printed on consent form was not sufficient to inform defendant of his rights under statute allowing defendant charged with misdemeanor to waive trial before district judge and to elect trial before magistrate judge, where the relevant portion of the consent form was three sentences long, and only one of the sentences addressed defendant's right to an Article III judge." U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, sec. 1 etseq; 18 U.S.C.A. sec 3401(b); FRCrP 58(b)(2), (b)(3)(A), 18 U.S.C.A. U.S. v. Gochis 196 F.R.D. 519 (2000)

"Court may always raise question of subject matter jurisdiction on appeal and in courts below." U,S. v. Prestenbach, 230 F.3d 780 (2000)

"Courts can always consider questions as to subject matter jurisdiction whenever raised and even sua sponte." U.S. v. White, 139 F.3d 998 cert den 119 S.Ct 343, 525 U.S. 393, 142 L.Ed.2d 283 (1998)

"Jurisdiction over a defendant requires both personal and subject matter jurisdiction." Boles v. State, 717 So.2d 877 (1998)

"Courts acquire authority to adjudicate matter if they have both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction." McKinney's CPL v. sec. 1.20 subd. 9. -- People v. Marzban, 660 N.Y.S.2d 808, 172 Misc.2d 987 (1997)
"Subject matter jurisdiction is determined from pleadings." Hall v. State, 933 S.W.2d 363, 326 Ark. 318, 326 Ark. 823 rehearing denied (1996)

"In its most fundamental or strict sense, 'jurisdiction' means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties, but the term may also refer to the situation where a court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter has no power to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites; action 'in excess of jurisdiction' by a court that has jurisdiction in a fundamental sense is not void, but only voidable." People v. Burnett, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 71 Cal.App 151 (1999)

"Judgment made when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void." Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18, transfer denied 741 N.E.2d 1247 (2000)

"In a criminal action, the trial court must not only have jurisdiction over the offense charged, but over the question which the judgment presumes to decide." State v. Kraushaar, 957 P.2d 1106, 264 Kan. 667 "Information is the only vehicle by which a court obtains and has limits placed on its jurisdiction." -Id (1998)

"Court lacked jurisdiction over defendant charged with possession of loaded firearm such as would enable it to entertain defendant's motion to dismiss indictment on ground that diplomatic immunity created legal impediment to his conviction, where defendant failed to appear in court to be arraigned on accusatory instrument." -Id

"In legal prosecution, all legal requisites must be complied with to confer jurisdiction on the court in criminal matters, as district attorney cannot confer jurisdiction by will alone." People v. Page, 667 N.Y.S.2d 689, 177 Misc.2d 448 (1998)
Where the court is without jurisdiction, it has no authority to do anything other than to dismiss the case." Fontenot v. State, 932 S.W.2d 185 "Judicial action without jurisdiction is void."-Id (1996)

"Jurisdiction means the power of a court to hear and determine a cause, which power is conferred by a constitution or a statute, or both." Penn v. Com. 528 S.E.2d 179, 32 Va.App. 422 (2000)
"A court cannot acquire jurisdiction to try a person for an act made criminal only by an unconstitutional law, and thus, an offense created by an unconstitutional statute, is no longer a crime and a conviction under such statute cannot be a legal cause for imprisonment." State v. Benzel, 583 N.W.2d 434, 220 Wis.2d 588 (1998)

"Jurisdiction is determined solely from face of information or indictment." State v. Lainez, 771 So.2d 617, and Snyder v. State 715 So.2d 367, review denied 727 So.2d 911 (2000)

"As a prerequisite for presiding over a case , a court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of an offense and of the person of the defendant; that is, two jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied before a court has authority to hear and determine a particular cause of action." Malone v. Com., 30 S.W.3d 180 (2000)

"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable defect which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings." State v. LaPier, 961 P.2d 1274, 289 Mont. 392, 1998 MT 174 (1998)
"Ruling made in absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a nullity." State v. Dvorak, 574 N.W.2d 492, 254 Neb. 87 (1998)

"If the trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction of defendants case, conviction and sentence would be void ab initio." State v. Swiger, 708 N.E.2d 1033, 125 Ohio.App.3d 456, dismissed, appeal not allowed, 694 N.E.2d 75, 82 Ohio St.3d 1411 (1998)

"Before a court may exercise judicial power to hear and determine a criminal prosecution, that court must possess three types of jursdiction: jurisdiction over the defendant, jurisdiction over the alleged crime, and territorial jurisdiction." Const. Art. 1 sec. 9, State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111 (1999)
"Without jurisdiction, criminal proceedings are a nullity." State v. Inglin, 592 N.W.2d 666, 274 Wis.2d 764 (1999)

"Criminal subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to inquire into charged crime, to apply applicable law, and to declare punishment." W.S.A. Const. Art. 7, sec. 8; W.S.A. 753.03, State v. West, 571 N.W.2d 196, 214 Wis.2d 468 , review denied 579 N.W.2d 44, 216 Wis.2d 612 (1997)

"Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction to render final judgments on felony charges." Muhammad v. State, 998 S.W.2d 763, 67 Ark.App 262 (1999)

"Circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over all misdemeanors which arise out of the same circumstances as a felony also charged." State v. Coble, 704 So.2d 197 (1998)

"Circuit court has no jurisdiction to try misdemeanors in the absence of a felony." Short v. State 767 So.2d 575 (2000)

"State Constitution establishes exclusive jurisdiction over felony cases in the superior court." State v. Sterling, 535 S.E.2d 329, 244 Ga.App. 328 (2000)

"There was no merit to defendant's contention that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him because his crime did not take place on federally owned land and the 10th Amendment reserved drug prosecutions such as his to the states." U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 10, Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, sec. 401(a), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. secs 841(a), 846. U.S. v. Deering 179 F.3d 592, cert. den. 120 S.Ct 361, 528 U.S. 945, 145 L.Ed.2d 283 (1999)

"Whether or not the government takes out the interstate commerce element of an offense has no effect on the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. U.S. v. Degan, 229 F.3d 553, 2000 Fed.App 367P. (2000)

"Federal criminal jurisdiction is limited to cases involving activities specifically made criminal by either Federal Constitution or Congress." U.S. v. Corona, 934 F.Supp. 740, affirmed in part 108 F.3d 565 (1996)

"Under 'effects doctrine,' a sovereign only possesses jurisdiction to prosecute a crime when, inter alia, the effect within the territory is substantial." U.S. v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, cert. den. 119 S.Ct 1026, 525 U.S. 1138, 143 L.Ed.2d 37 (1998)

"Under the theory of 'territorial jurisdiction,' jurisdiction to subject the accused to criminal prosecution rests in the courts of the state in which the crime is committed." State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, denial of post conviction relief confirmed 2000 WL 1827164 (1996)

"Territorial jurisdiction is an essential element of a crime, and a state is required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt." -Id

"Territorial jurisdiction" is question of state's power to prosecute and punish accused for crime and must be proven beyond reasonable doubt." People v. al-Ladkani, 647 N.Y.S.2d 666, 169 Misc.2d 720 (1996)

"Jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction in civil matters has no bearing on question whether a person may be brought to a State and tried there for crimes under that State's laws." In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 428 Mass. 842 (1999)

"Where the law provides method for acquiring jurisdiction over defendant in criminal action, as by indictment of grand jury, that method must be strictly pursued to acquire jurisdiction." People v. Page, 677 N.Y.S.2d 689, 177 Misc.2d 448 (1998)

"If defendant enters plea of not guilty and is in court on day of trial, the court has jurisdiction over his person." State v. Waters, 971 P.2d 538, 93 Wash.App 969 (1999)

"Subject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred on a federal court by stipulation, estoppel, or waiver." U.S. v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666. (1999)

"Power of courts to proceed, i.e., their jurisdiction over the subject matter, cannot be conferred by mere act of litigant, whether it amounts to consent, waiver, or estoppel, and hence the lack od such jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal." People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 52 Cal.App.4th 233 (1997)

"Jurisdiction can not be conferred to court by agreement of parties." Akins v. State, 691 So.2d 587 (1997)

"Lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent or waived by entry of a guilty plea; doctrine of waiver cannot be effective when court lacks jurisdiction over the case itself." Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185 rehearing denied , review dismissed 728 So.2d 205 (1998)
"Party cannot stipulate to jurisdiction when court lacks it." Sterling v. State, 682 So.2d 694 (1996)

"Where no cognizable crime is charged, the court lacks fundamental subject matter jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction, i.e. it is powerless in such circumstances to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment for an offense." Robinson v. State, 728 A.2d 698, 353 Md. 683 (1999)

"Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent; nor may subject matter jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of parties." State v. Trevino, 556 N.W.2d 638, 251 Neb. 344 (1996)

"Appearance ticket is not accusatory instrument and its filing does not confer jurisdiction over defendant." People v. Gabbay, 670 N.Y.S.2d 962, 175 Misc.2d 421 appeal denied 678 N.Y.S.2d 26, 92 N.Y.2d 879, 700 N.E.2d 564 (1997)

"Service of an appearance ticket on an accused does not confer personal or subject matter jurisdiction upon a criminal court." People v. Giusti, 673 N.Y.S.2d 824, 176 Misc.2d 377 (1998)

"No valid conviction can occur if the charging instrument is void." State v. Wilson, 6 S.W.3d 504 (1998)
"Threshold issue of whether court has jurisdiction to resolve pending controversy is fundamental and cannot be ignored; accordingly, court may sua sponte address issue, as subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement of parties, but must be vested in court by constitution or statute." State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, on remand 1997 WL334879. (1996)

"While superior court lacks authority to try a defendant for a felony charged by information with an offense not previously subjected to a preliminary hearing , violation of this limitation on the superior court's power would constitute action in excess of jurisdiction, waivable error, and not non-waivable subject matter jurisdiction." People v. Burnett, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 71 Cal.App.4th 151 (1999)

"Trial court acts without jurisdiction when it acts without inherent or common law authority, nor any authority by statute or rule." State v. Rodriguez, 725 A.2d 635, 125 Md.App 428, cert den 731 A.2d 971, 354 Md. 573 (1999)

"Criminal law magistrates have no power of their own and are unable to enforce any ruling." V.T.C.A., Government Code sec. 54.651 et seq., Davis v. State, 956 S.W.2d 555 (1997)

"A court's authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over a case may be restricted by Filure to comply with statutory requirements that are mandatory in nature and, thus, are prerequisite to court's lawful exercise of that jurisdiction." Moore v. Com., 527 S.E.2d 406, 259 Va. 431 (2000)

"Only Congress can make an act a crime, affix punishment to it, and declare court that shall have jurisdiction." U.S. v. Beckford, 966 F.Supp. 1415 (1997)



United States v Guest 383 U S 745  1966  Right to Travel

United States v Guest, 383 U S 745, March 28, 1966
HARLAN, J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
383 U.S. 745
United States v. Guest
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

No. 65 Argued: November 9, 1965 --- Decided: March 28, 1966

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I and II [n1] of the Court's opinion, but I cannot subscribe to Part III in its full sweep. To the extent that it is there held that 18 U.S.C.  ? 241 (1964 ed.) reaches conspiracies, embracing only the action of [p763] private persons, to obstruct or otherwise interfere with the right of citizens freely to engage in interstate travel, I am constrained to dissent. On the other hand, I agree that ? 241 does embrace state interference with such interstate travel, and I therefore consider that this aspect of the indictment is sustainable on the reasoning of Part II of the Court's opinion.

This right to travel must be found in the Constitution itself. This is so because ? 241 covers only conspiracies to interfere with any citizen in the "free exercise or enjoyment" of a right or privilege "secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States," and no "right to travel" can be found in ? 241 or in any other law of the United States. My disagreement with this phase of the Court's opinion lies in this: while past cases do indeed establish that there is a constitutional "right to travel" between States free from unreasonable governmental interference, today's decision is the first to hold that such movement is also protected against private interference, and, depending on the constitutional source of the right, I think it either unwise or impermissible so to read the Constitution.

Preliminarily, nothing in the Constitution expressly secures the right to travel. In contrast, the Articles of Confederation provided in Art. IV:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States, and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively. . . [p764]
This right to "free ingress and regress" was eliminated from the draft of the Constitution without discussion even though the main objective of the Convention was to create a stronger union. It has been assumed that the clause was dropped because it was so obviously an essential part of our federal structure that it was necessarily subsumed under more general clauses of the Constitution. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294. I propose to examine the several asserted constitutional bases for the right to travel, and the scope of its protection in relation to each source.

I

Because of the close proximity of the right of ingress and regress to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation, it has long been declared that the right is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship under the Constitution. In the influential opinion of Mr. Justice Washington on circuit, Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.C.C. 371 (1825), the court addressed itself to the question -- "what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?" Id. at 380. Corfield was concerned with a New Jersey statute restricting to state citizens the right to rake for oysters, a statute which the court upheld. In analyzing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, ? 2, the court stated that it confined "these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental," and listed among them

The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise. . . .
Id. at 380-381.

The dictum in Corfield was given general approval in the first opinion of this Court to deal directly with the right of free movement, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, [p765] which struck down a Nevada statute taxing persons leaving the State. It is first noteworthy that, in his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Clifford asserted that he would hold the statute void exclusively on commerce grounds, for he was clear "that the State legislature cannot impose any such burden upon commerce among the several States." 6 Wall. at 49. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, however, eschewed reliance on the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause and looked rather to the nature of the federal union:

The people of these United States constitute one nation. . . . This government has necessarily a capital established by law. . . . That government has a right to call to this point any or all of its citizens to aid in its service. . . . The government, also, has its offices of secondary importance in all other parts of the country. On the sea-coasts and on the rivers, it has its ports of entry. In the interior, it has its land offices, its revenue offices, and its sub-treasuries. In all these, it demands the services of its citizens, and is entitled to bring them to those points from all quarters of the nation, and no power can exist in a State to obstruct this right that would not enable it to defeat the purposes for which the government was established.

6 Wall. at 43-44. Accompanying this need of the Federal Government, the Court found a correlative right of the citizen to move unimpeded throughout the land:
He has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are [p766] conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it.

6 Wall. at 44. The focus of that opinion, very clearly, was thus on impediments by the States on free movement by citizens. This is emphasized subsequently when Mr. Justice Miller asserts that this approach is "neither novel nor unsupported by authority," because it is, fundamentally, a question of the exercise of a State's taxing power to obstruct the functions of the Federal Government:
[T]he right of the States in this mode to impede or embarrass the constitutional operations of that government, or the rights which its citizens hold under it, has been uniformly denied.
6 Wall. at 44-45.

Later cases, alluding to privileges and immunities, have in dicta included the right to free movement. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180; Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78.

Although the right to travel thus has respectable precedent to support its status as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship, it is important to note that those cases all dealt with the right of travel simply as affected by oppressive state action. Only one prior case in this Court, United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, was argued precisely in terms of a right to free movement, as against interference by private individuals. There, the Government alleged a conspiracy under the predecessor of ? 241 against the perpetrators of the notorious Bisbee Deportations. [n2] The case was argued straightforwardly in terms of whether the right to free ingress and [p767] egress, admitted by both parties to be a right of national citizenship, was constitutionally guaranteed against private conspiracies. The Brief for the Defendants in Error, whose counsel was Charles Evans Hughes, later Chief Justice of the United States, gives as one of its main points:
So far as there is a right pertaining to Federal citizenship to have free ingress or egress with respect to the several States, the right is essentially one of protection against the action of the States themselves and of those acting under their authority.

Brief, at p. i. The Court, with one dissent, accepted this interpretation of the right of unrestricted interstate movement, observing that Crandall v. Nevada, supra, was inapplicable because, inter alia, it dealt with state action. 254 U.S. at 299. More recent cases discussing or applying the right to interstate travel have always been in the context of oppressive state action. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, and other cases discussed infra. [n3]

It is accordingly apparent that the right to unimpeded interstate travel, regarded as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship, was historically seen as a method of breaking down state provincialism, and facilitating the creation of a true federal union. In the one case in which a private conspiracy to obstruct such movement was heretofore presented to this Court, the predecessor of the very statute we apply today was held not to encompass such a right.

II

A second possible constitutional basis for the right to move among the States without interference is the Commerce Clause. When Mr. Justice Washington articulated [p768] the right in Corfield, it was in the context of a state statute impeding economic activity by outsiders, and he cast his statement in economic terms. 4 Wash. C. C., at 380-381. The two concurring Justices in Crandall v. Nevada, supra, rested solely on the commerce argument, indicating again the close connection between freedom of commerce and travel as principles of our federal union. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, the Court held squarely that the right to unimpeded movement of persons is guaranteed against oppressive state legislation by the Commerce Clause, and declared unconstitutional a California statute restricting the entry of indigents into that State.

Application of the Commerce Clause to this area has the advantage of supplying a longer tradition of case law and more refined principles of adjudication. States do have rights of taxation and quarantine, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. at 184 (concurring opinion), which must be weighed against the general right of free movement, and Commerce Clause adjudication has traditionally been the means of reconciling these interests. Yet this approach to the right to travel, like that found in the privileges and immunities cases, is concerned with the interrelation of state and federal power, not -- with an exception to be dealt with in a moment -- with private interference.
The case of In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, may be thought to raise some doubts as to this proposition. There, the United States sought to enjoin Debs and members of his union from continuing to obstruct -- by means of a strike -- interstate commerce and the passage of the mails. The Court held that Congress and the Executive could certainly act to keep the channels of interstate commerce open, and that a court of equity had no less power to enjoin what amounted to a public nuisance. It might [p769] be argued that to the extent Debs permits the Federal Government to obtain an injunction against the private conspiracy alleged in the present indictment, [n4] the criminal statute should be applicable as well on the ground that the governmental interest in both cases is the same, namely to vindicate the underlying policy of the Commerce Clause. However, ? 241 is not directed toward the vindication of governmental interests; it requires a private right under federal law. No such right can be found in Debs, which stands simply for the proposition that the Commerce Clause gives the Federal Government standing to sue on a basis similar to that of private individuals under nuisance law. The substantive rights of private persons to enjoin such impediments, of course, devolve from state, not federal, law; any seemingly inconsistent discussion in Debs would appear substantially vitiated by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64.

I cannot find in any of this past case law any solid support for a conclusion that the Commerce Clause embraces a right to be free from private interference. And the Court's opinion here makes no such suggestion.

III

One other possible source for the right to travel should be mentioned. Professor Chafee, in his thoughtful study, "Freedom of Movement," [n5] finds both the privileges and immunities approach and the Commerce Clause approach unsatisfactory. After a thorough review of the history [p770] and cases dealing with the question, he concludes that this "valuable human right," id. at 209, is best seen in due process terms:

Already, in several decisions, the Court has used the Due Process Clause to safeguard the right of the members of any race to reside where they please inside a state, regardless of ordinances and injunctions. Why is not this clause equally available to assure the right to live in any state one desires? And unreasonable restraints by the national government on mobility can be upset by the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment. . . . Thus, the "liberty" of all human beings which cannot be taken away without due process of law includes liberty of speech, press, assembly, religion, and also liberty of movement.
Id. at 192-193.

This due process approach to the right to unimpeded movement has been endorsed by this Court. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116"]357 U.S. 116, the Court asserted that "The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment," id. at 125, citing Crandall v. Nevada, supra, and Edwards v. California, supra. It is true that the holding in that case turned essentially on statutory grounds. However, in 357 U.S. 116, the Court asserted that "The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment," id. at 125, citing Crandall v. Nevada, supra, and Edwards v. California, supra. It is true that the holding in that case turned essentially on statutory grounds. However, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, the Court, applying this constitutional doctrine, struck down a federal statute forbidding members of Communist organizations to obtain passports. Both the majority and dissenting opinions affirmed the principle that the right to travel is an aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.

Viewing the right to travel in due process terms, of course, would clearly make it inapplicable to the present case, for due process speaks only to governmental action [p771 ]

IV

This survey of the various bases for rounding the "right to travel" is conclusive only to the extent of showing that there has never been an acknowledged constitutional right to be free from private interference, and that the right in question has traditionally been seen and applied, whatever the constitutional underpinning asserted, only against governmental impediments. The right involved being as nebulous as it is, however, it is necessary to consider it in terms of policy as well as precedent.

As a general proposition, it seems to me very dubious that the Constitution was intended to create certain rights of private individuals as against other private individuals. The Constitutional Convention was called to establish a nation, not to reform the common law. Even the Bill of Rights, designed to protect personal liberties, was directed at rights against governmental authority, not other individuals. It is true that there is a very narrow range of rights against individuals which have been read into the Constitution. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, the Court held that implicit in the Constitution is the right of citizens to be free of private interference in federal elections. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, extended this coverage to primaries. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, applied the predecessor of ? 241 to a conspiracy to injure someone in the custody of a United States marshal; the case has been read as dealing with a privilege and immunity of citizenship, but it would seem to have depended as well on extrapolations from statutory provisions providing for supervision of prisoners. The Court in In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, extending Logan, supra, declared that there was a right of federal citizenship to inform federal officials of violations of federal law. See also United [p772] States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, which announced in dicta a federal right to assemble to petition the Congress for a redress of grievances.

Whatever the validity of these cases on their own terms, they are hardly persuasive authorities for adding to the collection of privileges and immunities the right to be free of private impediments to travel. The cases just discussed are narrow, and are essentially concerned with the vindication of important relationships with the Federal Government voting in federal elections, involvement in federal law enforcement, communicating with the Federal Government. The present case stands on a considerably different footing.

It is arguable that the same considerations which led the Court on numerous occasions to find a right of free movement against oppressive state action now justify a similar result with respect to private impediments. Crandall v. Nevada, supra, spoke of the need to travel to the capital, to serve and consult with the offices of government. A basic reason for the formation of this Nation was to facilitate commercial intercourse; intellectual, cultural, scientific, social, and political interests are likewise served by free movement. Surely these interests can be impeded by private vigilantes as well as by state action. Although this argument is not without force, I do not think it is particularly persuasive. There is a difference in power between States and private groups so great that analogies between the two tend to be misleading. If the State obstructs free intercourse of goods, people, or ideas, the bonds of the union are threatened; if a private group effectively stops such communication, there is, at most, a temporary breakdown of law and order, to be remedied by the exercise of state authority or by appropriate federal legislation.

To decline to find a constitutional right of the nature asserted here does not render the Federal Government [p773] helpless. As to interstate commerce by railroads, federal law already provides remedies for "undue or unreasonable prejudice," 24 Stat. 380, as amended,49  U.S.C.  ? 3(1) (1964 ed.), which has been held to apply to racial discrimination. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816.

A similar statute applies to motor carriers, 49 Stat. 558, as amended, 49 U.S.C. ? 316(d) (1964 ed.), and to air carriers, 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. ? 1374(b) (1964 ed.). See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S.  454; Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, deals with other types of obstructions to interstate commerce. Indeed, under the Court's present holding, it is arguable that any conspiracy to discriminate in public accommodations having the effect of impeding interstate commerce could be reached under ? 241, unaided by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because Congress has wide authority to legislate in this area, it seems unnecessary -- if prudential grounds are of any relevance, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.  186, 258-259 (CLARK, J., concurring) -- to strain to find a dubious constitutional right.

V

If I have succeeded in showing anything in this constitutional exercise, it is that, until today, there was no federal right to be free from private interference with interstate transit, and very little reason for creating one. Although the Court has ostensibly only "discovered" this private right in the Constitution and then applied ? 241 mechanically to punish those who conspire to threaten it, it should be recognized that what the Court has in effect done is to use this all-encompassing criminal statute to fashion federal common law crimes, forbidden to the federal judiciary since the 1812 decision in United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32. My Brother DOUGLAS, dissenting in United States v. Classic, supra, [p774] noted well the dangers of the indiscriminate application of the predecessor of ? 241:
It is not enough for us to find in the vague penumbra of a statute some offense about which Congress could have legislated, and then to particularize it as a crime because it is highly offensive.
313 U.S. at 331-332.

I do not gainsay that the immunities and commerce provisions of the Constitution leave the way open for the finding of this "private" constitutional right, since they do not speak solely in terms of governmental action. Nevertheless, I think it wrong to sustain a criminal indictment on such an uncertain ground. To do so subjects ? 241 to serious challenge on the score of vagueness, and serves in effect to place this Court in the position of making criminal law under the name of constitutional interpretation. It is difficult to subdue misgivings about the potentialities of this decision.

I would sustain this aspect of the indictment only on the premise that it sufficiently alleges state interference with interstate travel, and on no other ground.
1. The action of three of the Justices who join the Court's opinion in nonetheless cursorily pronouncing themselves on the far-reaching constitutional questions deliberately not reached in Part II seems to me, to say the very least, extraordinary.
2. For a discussion of the deportations, see The President's Mediation Comm'n, Report on the Bisbee Deportations (November 6, 1917).
3. The Court's reliance on United States v. Moore, 129 F. 630, is misplaced. That case held only that it was not a privilege or immunity to organize labor unions. The reference to "the right to pass from one state to any other" was purely incidental dictum.
4. It is not even clear that an equity court would enjoin a conspiracy of the kind alleged here, for traditionally equity will not enjoin a crime. See Developments in the Law -- Injunctions, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 994, 1013-1018 (1965).
5. In Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, at 162 (1956).



Cases My Right of Defense Against Unlawful Arrest
MY RIGHT OF DEFENSE AGAINST
UNLAWFUL ARREST
LAWFUL CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE

"Citizens may resist unlawful arrest to the point of taking an arresting officer's life if necessary." Plummer v. State, 136 Ind. 306. This premise was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case: John Bad Elk v. U.S., 177 U.S. 529. The Court stated:

"Where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer had no right. What may be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed."

"An arrest made with a defective warrant, or one issued without affidavit, or one that fails to allege a crime is within jurisdiction, and one who is being arrested, may resist arrest and break away. if the arresting officer is killed by one who is so resisting, the killing will be no more than an involuntary manslaughter." Housh v. People, 75 111. 491; reaffirmed and quoted in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452; State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio 349; State v Rousseau, 241 P. 2d 447; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621.
"When a person, being without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self defense, his assailant is killed, he is justified." Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 1.

"These principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully uses such force and violence." Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. I; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.
"An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery." (State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260).

"Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person attempting the arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force, as in self- defense." (State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 100).

"One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is being assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus it is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody, without resistance." (Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910).

"Story affirmed the right of self-defense by persons held illegally. In his own writings, he had admitted that 'a situation could arise in which the checks-and-balances principle ceased to work and the various branches of government concurred in a gross usurpation.' There would be no usual remedy by changing the law or passing an amendment to the Constitution, should the oppressed party be a minority. Story concluded, 'If there be any remedy at all ... it is a remedy never provided for by human institutions.' That was the `ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply force against ruinous injustice.'" (From Mutiny on the Amistad by Howard Jones, Oxford University Press, 1987, an account of the reading of the decision in the case by Justice Joseph Story of the Supreme Court.

As for grounds for arrest: "The carrying of arms in a quiet, peaceable, and orderly manner, concealed on or about the person, is not a breach of the peace. Nor does such an act of itself, lead to a breach of the peace." (Wharton's Criminal and Civil Procedure, 12th Ed., Vol.2: Judy v. Lashley, 5 W. Va. 628, 41 S.E. 197)

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Thanks. Maybe Lauren might like that Right to Travel case of 1966; to read all of this later... -- Joe

[JosephSHaas]

HAS ANOTHER ONE OF THE BROWNS SUPPORTERS BEEN TAKEN DOWN??

some of you may remember a few days back i posted about a guy that went by the name "old buck" who camped out on the browns property in his camper for about 6 weeks this summer. he informed the marshalls and police he was there but was unarmed and would stay that way. he last posted through his myspace saying that the federal prosecutors had contacted his lawyer to have him come in and speak to them. he asked if they were offering "immunity" they said no the lawyer said no back. jim aka:old buck said he wouldnt speak even with immunity because he didnt do anything wrong! they told his lawyer , who wrote a book that ron paul wrote the forward to, that if he didnt speak to them they are going to do everything they can to indict him. he said so indict me! \

  today i try to contact jim through his myspace page and it has been hijacked by the same thugs that hijacked ed and elaines time2makeastand website. it looks identical and the only "friend" is ed and elaines old page now labeled as "showing ed and elaine brown supporters the law" jims old myspace is myspace.com/twostraws    see for yourself. he is now unreachable. if anyone has seen or heard from jim please let us know. if he has been arrested we would like to verify his safety.

  we do not know if he has been arrested or how long the page has been taken over for but if history is a guide ed and elaines page wasnt hijacked until several days after their arrest.

Keith:  What is it with these U.S. Marshals as the "arm of the court", when they say that they only want to talk "wich ya"?  Gary still wants to talk "to" me. October and November have gone by, and so has the retaliation time, or has it?  I keep on telling him to tell "them", his higher-ups who are really the lower-downs, which positions he ought to take-over as a whistle-blower,  of the goons back in Fall 1998 on the "Concord Bomber" case: yeah! I talked/ chit chatted with two of them at my residence one day as they blocked the end of the driveway, and then they wanted me to talk more to the Grand Jury.  I said: fine, but was blocked and herded to see the F.B.I. and Mr. Big-Shot "Profiler" who never got his man; a waste of taxpayer $money, the guy ought to get into a different line of work, like when then Gov. John H. Sununu, the father (with his stamp collection on Air Force Two from Washington, D.C. to sell it in New York City) said he'd never hire Michael Cornealius to even run a lemonade stand. Sununu, the son came through in getting me the Federal A.O.C. # to write to about this non-filing to N.H. RSA Ch. 123:1 from 1-8-17, but what did they do with my letter to them? As Clark Gable said in "Gone With The Wind": I don't give a damn!  The burden of proof is on them to prove jurisdiction and they don't have it!  If they arrested Jim, then the way I see it is far beyond mere stupidity as they might claim in the Four Freedom Keepers, even though I put everyone on notice BEFOREhand, to that of a definite MAL-icious prosecution.  This Tom Colantuono is a menace to society.  He's the Puppet Master to the Marshal goons as his puppets under his control.  There is no check-and-balance between these two needing the appointing authority of the Senate to investigate this crap that smells to high heaven.  The stench is like a pile of manure that's been sitting there for years ready to ignite under its own internal corruption.  It wouldn't surprise me if Tom Colantuono burst into flames one of these days from what's known as: "Spontaneous Human Combustion", him not needing the slow track to hell, but a graduate of the mis-information super-highway: so full of himself that he explodes into flames. 

- - Joe

modification: into flames, websites:

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spontaneous_human_combustion
2. http://www.crystalinks.com/shc.html
3. http://science.howstuffworks.com/shc.htm
4. http://castleofspirits.com/shc.html
5. http://www.csicop.org/si/9611/shc.html
6. http://theshadowlands.net/spon.htm
7. http://anomalyinfo.com/bw_articles/ga00003.shtml