Court-cam civil dis set for March 3 Keene

[thinkliberty]

Does anyone know what the thugs "charged" Dave with? I am wondering if it is the wiretapping law or some other bogus you didn't obey the gang

Believe it or not ["Drum roll, please!"] Disorderly Conduct.  Where can I sign up to be on the jury to nullify that one?

http://gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/644/644-2.htm Is the what "disorderly conduct" is defined as by the state of NH. I think Dave can be found not guilty on this one. 

[AntonLee]

my my my what disgusting bureaucrats there are in Keene. 

[Dan]

It seems they're just about ready to quit playing games with all these complicated laws and just make the one crime-- Disobeying. Once the law has been simplified like that, then this statement will finally be true: "Ignorance of THE LAW is no excuse".

+1 Insightful!

[FTL_Ian]

Post-arrest interview with Dave:

[J’raxis 270145]

Does anyone know what the thugs "charged" Dave with? I am wondering if it is the wiretapping law or some other bogus you didn't obey the gang

RSA 644:2, III (b), specifically:—

III. He purposely causes a breach of the peace, public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creates a risk thereof, by:
   (b) Disrupting the orderly conduct of business in any public or governmental facility;

[Sam A. Robrin]

I think Dave can be found not guilty on this one. 

He can, but he may not . . .

[thinkliberty]

Does anyone know what the thugs "charged" Dave with? I am wondering if it is the wiretapping law or some other bogus you didn't obey the gang

RSA 644:2, III (b), specifically:—

III. He purposely causes a breach of the peace, public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creates a risk thereof, by:
   (b) Disrupting the orderly conduct of business in any public or governmental facility;

His video recording creates no physical inconvenience to anyone. It makes no sound and there for cannot be annoying or alarming, was/is not reckless and did not create a risk. 

His did not entice or lead anyone to tumult and did not cause any disorder.  Therefore could not have caused a disruption and did not imped on the orderly conduct of business.

[Coconut]

Anyone want to go to KPD tonight and see if I can find out how to get my voice recorder back?

[Puke]

Hidden recording devices are needed.

[Coconut]

Hidden recording devices are needed.

This one was on Ridley when he was arrested.

I had another in my hand that was very visible that they did not take.

[David]

my my my what disgusting bureaucrats there are in Keene. 

no one likes their power being challenged, in keene or elsewhere.  We have been pushing back in a soft but direct manner longer than anyone else that i know of, and yeah, they do not like it.   

[J’raxis 270145]

Does anyone know what the thugs "charged" Dave with? I am wondering if it is the wiretapping law or some other bogus you didn't obey the gang

RSA 644:2, III (b), specifically:—

III. He purposely causes a breach of the peace, public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creates a risk thereof, by:
   (b) Disrupting the orderly conduct of business in any public or governmental facility;

His video recording creates no physical inconvenience to anyone. It makes no sound and there for cannot be annoying or alarming, was/is not reckless and did not create a risk. 

His did not entice or lead anyone to tumult and did not cause any disorder.  Therefore could not have caused a disruption and did not imped on the orderly conduct of business.

Indeed. Except, 644:2 is just a long-winded way of saying, "you didn't do what we told you to."

[Silent_Bob]

My .02...



Article 8th. [Accountability of Magistrates and Officers; Public's Right
to Know.]

  All power residing originally in, and being derived from, the people,
all the magistrates and officers of government are their substitutes and
agents, and at all times accountable to them. Government, therefore,
should be open, accessible, accountable and responsive. To that end, the
public's right of access to governmental proceedings and records shall not
be unreasonably restricted.


91-A:1 Preamble

  Openness in the conduct of public business is essential to a democratic
society. The purpose of this chapter is to ensure both the greatest
possible public access to the actions, discussions and records of all
public bodies, and their accountability to the people.



91-A:1-a Definitions.

II. "Governmental proceedings" means the transaction of any
functions affecting any or all citizens of the state by a
public body.

91-A:2 Meetings Open to Public.

II ... Any person shall be permitted to use recording
devices, including, but not limited to, tape recorders,
cameras, and videotape equipment, at such meetings. 

91-A:7 Violation.

  Any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may
petition the superior court for injunctive relief. In order
to satisfy the purposes of this chapter, the courts shall
give proceedings under this chapter high priority on the
court calendar. Such a petitioner may appear with or without
counsel. The petition shall be deemed sufficient if it states
facts constituting a violation of this chapter, and may be
filed by the petitioner or his or her counsel with the clerk
of court or any justice thereof. Thereupon the clerk of court
or any justice shall order service by copy of the petition on
the person or persons charged. When any justice shall find
that time probably is of the essence, he or she may order
notice by any reasonable means, and he or she shall have
authority to issue an order ex parte when he or she shall
reasonably deem such an order necessary to insure compliance
with the provisions of this chapter.

91-A:8 Remedies.

  I. If any public body or agency or employee or member
thereof, in violation of the provisions of this chapter,
refuses to provide a governmental record or refuses access to
a governmental proceeding to a person who reasonably requests
the same, such public body, public agency, or person shall be
liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in a
lawsuit under this chapter provided that the court finds that
such lawsuit was necessary in order to make the information
available or the proceeding open to the public. Fees shall
not be awarded unless the court finds that the public body,
public agency, or person knew or should have known that the
conduct engaged in was a violation of this chapter or where
the parties, by agreement, provide that no such fees shall be
paid. In any case where fees are awarded under this chapter,
upon a finding that an officer, employee, or other official
of a public body or agency has acted in bad faith in refusing
to allow access to a governmental proceeding or to provide a
governmental record, the court may award such fees personally
against such officer, employee, or other official.


WMUR CHANNEL NINE v. N.H. DEP'T, 154 N.H. 46 (2006)

WMUR CHANNEL NINE v. NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME.

No. 2005-787.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

Merrimack.

Argued: June 7, 2006.

Opinion Issued: August 3, 2006.


1. Administrative Law — Hearings — Due
Process

    Because the New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game failed to
  demonstrate that an applicant for a hunting license had a due
  process right in a hearing on denial of the application, its
  argument that it properly balanced the right to videotape the
  hearing against the applicant's right to due process was rejected.

2. Administrative Law — Hearings — Open

    An administrative rule on a hearing officer's regulation and
  control of hearings did not authorize the executive director of
  the New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game to exclude cameras
  from a hearing in violation of the Right-to-Know Law. N.H. Admin
  Rules, Fis. 203.01(b); RSA 91-A:2, II.

3. Attorneys — Fees — Particular Cases

    Because it could not be concluded that the executive director of
  the New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game either knew or
  should have known that excluding cameras from a hearing would
  violate the Right-to-Know Law, the trial court's denial of the
  television station's request for attorney's fees was affirmed. RSA
  91-A:8.

  Orr & Reno, P.A., of Concord (Emily Gray
Rice and Jeffrey C. Spear on the brief, and
Ms. Rice orally), for the plaintiff.

  Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Daniel J.
Mullen, associate attorney general, on the brief and
orally), for the defendant.

  GALWAY, J.

  The petitioner, WMUR Channel Nine (WMUR), appeals an order
of the Superior Court (Fitzgerald, J.) denying WMUR's
request for attorney's fees after finding that the respondent
violated the Right-to-Know Law, RSA chapter 91-A (2001 &
Supp. 2005). The respondent, the New Hampshire Department of
Fish and Game (department), cross-appeals the superior court's
ruling that the department violated RSA chapter 91-A. We
affirm.

  The record supports the following facts. In 1993, the
department revoked John Hardwick's hunting license after he
shot and killed another hunter while deer hunting. In September
2004, Hardwick applied for a new hunting license. The
department denied the application. Hardwick appealed the
decision to the department's executive director, Lee Perry,
pursuant to RSA 214:17 (2000). Perry held a pre-hearing
conference, at which Hardwick argued that the hearing should be
closed to the public
Page 47
because he was a "simple and shy person who would freeze if he
had to make his case" in public. Perry decided to close the
hearing to cameras and audio recording devices because he
concluded that the commotion caused by television cameras and
lights would effectively deprive Hardwick of his opportunity to
be heard on his hunting license reinstatement claim. After the
conference, Perry issued a notice of hearing stating that the
hearing would be closed to television cameras and recording
devices. On the date of Hardwick's appeal hearing in November,
WMUR appeared with television cameras. An employee of WMUR was
permitted to attend the hearing and take notes, but cameras
were barred. WMUR filed a petition for an injunction with the
superior court to permit access for the cameras; however, the
court was unable to act upon the motion before the hearing's
conclusion.

  Subsequent to the hearing, the parties agreed to submit the
matter to the superior court on cross-motions for summary
judgment. WMUR's motion requested findings that the department
violated RSA chapter 91-A by refusing to allow WMUR to
videotape the November hearing, and that the violation entitled
WMUR to attorney's fees. The department's cross-motion argued
that Perry's decision to exclude cameras was reasonable and
that WMUR's rights under RSA chapter 91-A were not violated.
The trial court found that RSA 91-A:2, II applied and that the
department violated the statute by not permitting cameras into
the hearing. The trial court found that WMUR was not entitled
to attorney's fees, however, because Perry neither knew nor
should have known that his conduct violated RSA chapter 91-A.

  Both parties appeal the trial court's order. The parties do not
dispute any material facts in the case. The department argues
that the trial court erroneously decided that the department
violated RSA 91-A:2, II by excluding cameras. WMUR argues that
the trial court erroneously decided that WMUR was not entitled
to attorney's fees.

  In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary
judgment,

  we consider the affidavits and other evidence, and all
  inferences properly drawn from them, in the light most
  favorable to the non-moving party. If our review of
  the evidence does not reveal any genuine issue of
  material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to
  judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the trial
  court's decision. We review the trial court's
  application of the law to the facts de novo.

Dalton Hydro v. Town of Dalton, 153 N.H. 75, 77 (2005)
(citations omitted). "The interpretation of a statute,
including the Right-to-Know Law, is to be decided ultimately by
this court." Goode v. N.H. Legislative
Page 48
Budget Assistant, 148 N.H. 551, 553 (2002). We first
look to the plain meaning of the words used in the statute and
will consider legislative history only if the statutory
language is ambiguous. Id. at 553-54. "We resolve
questions regarding the [Right-to-Know] law with a view to
providing the utmost information in order to best effectuate
the statutory and constitutional objective of facilitating
access to all public documents." Id. at 554.

I. Violation of RSA 91-A:2, II

  Both parties rely upon RSA chapter 91-A, which governs access
to public records and meetings. The relevant language from RSA
91-A:2 states: "All public proceedings shall be open to the
public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any
meetings of those bodies or agencies. . . . Any person shall be
permitted to use recording devices, including, but not limited
to, tape recorders, cameras and videotape equipment, at such
meetings."

  The department does not dispute the trial court's conclusion
that Hardwick's hearing before the department was a "public
proceeding" under RSA 91-A:2, II. Further, the department
concedes that the statute gives any person, including the
media, a right to use video recording equipment in a public
proceeding. Despite the applicability of RSA 91-A:2, II, the
department argues that Perry's decision to exclude cameras from
the hearing was correct for two reasons. First, Perry correctly
balanced WMUR's right to videotape the hearing against
Hardwick's constitutional due process right to have a fair
hearing and an opportunity to be heard. Perry's balancing was
proper, the department argues, because of his concern that
Hardwick would not have been able to present fairly his
position with a camera present. Second, the department argues
that its administrative rules granted Perry independent
authority to exclude the cameras.

  Though the department argues that Perry properly balanced
WMUR's right to videotape the hearing against Hardwick's right
to due process, the department has not developed a
constitutional due process argument. The department simply
states that Hardwick had a due process right to be heard and to
have a fair hearing. The department did not identify whether
the rights implicated by Perry's balancing arise under the
Federal or the New Hampshire Constitution. If the department
meant to argue under the State Constitution, we decline to
address the argument. We will not address a party's State
constitutional argument on appeal if the party does not
specifically invoke in its brief a provision of the State
Constitution. State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632
(1986). Because the department failed to invoke a specific due
process provision of the
New Hampshire
Constitution,
Page 49
we limit our due process analysis to the Federal
Constitution. See Town of Nottingham v. Newman,
147 N.H. 131, 135 (2001) (addressing solely the defendants' federal
due process argument because they failed to invoke Part I,
Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution).

  It is well settled that the right to due process under the
Federal Constitution arises only when there is a
constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest
at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221
(2005). The department, however, has not identified a
constitutionally protected interest that was at stake in
Hardwick's hearing. Had the department done so, it presumably
would have pointed to Hardwick's interest in obtaining a
hunting license. We have never held, however, that a hunting
license is a constitutionally protected right, and such a
proposition is questionable, since other jurisdictions have
specifically held that a hunting or fishing license is not a
property interest for purposes of due process. E.g., Conti
v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Pennsylvania Game Com'n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 257
(Pa. 1995). We decline to consider such a proposition when
neither party has argued it. Because the department has failed
to demonstrate that Hardwick had a due process right in the
hearing, we reject the department's first argument.

  The department's second argument, that its administrative rules
gave Perry the authority to override RSA 91-A:2, II, is also
unavailing. The department's rules provide: "A presiding
[hearing] officer shall as necessary: (1) Regulate and control
the course of a hearing; . . . [and] ( Take any other action
consistent with applicable statutes, rules and case law
necessary to conduct the hearing and complete the record in a
fair and timely manner." N.H. ADMIN RULES, Fis 203.01(b). The
department asserts that this rule permitted Perry to issue an
order that excluded cameras from the hearing. An agency,
however, must "comply with the governing statute, in both
letter and spirit, and agency regulations which contradict the
terms of a governing statute exceed the agency's authority."
Appeal of Town of Nottingham, 153 N.H. 539, 555 (2006)
(quotations and citations omitted). There is no dispute that
RSA 91-A:2, II applied to the department's hearing, and was,
thus, a governing statute. Further, the express language of RSA
91-A:2, II states that "[a]ny person shall be permitted to use
recording devices, including . . . videotape equipment, at such
meetings." Assuming without deciding that the department's
interpretation of Rule 203.01(b) is accurate and that the rule
purports to authorize the department to exclude cameras from
the hearing, the rule conflicts with RSA 91-A:2, II.
Accordingly, Rule 203.01(b) did not
Page 50
authorize Perry to exclude cameras from Hardwick's hearing in
violation of RSA 91-A:2, II. Because the department has failed
to provide an adequate reason for Perry's exclusion of cameras
at Hardwick's hearing, we affirm the trial court's ruling that
the department violated RSA 91-A:2.

II. Attorney's Fees

  Whether the trial court should have awarded attorney's fees to
WMUR implicates RSA 91-A:8, which states, in pertinent part:

  If any body or agency or employee or member thereof,
  in violation of the provisions of this chapter,
  refuses to provide a public record or refuses access
  to a public proceeding to a person who reasonably
  requests the same, such body, agency, or person shall
  be liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs
  incurred in a lawsuit under this chapter provided that
  the court finds that such lawsuit was necessary in
  order to make the information available or the
  proceeding open to the public. Fees shall not be
  awarded unless the court finds that the body, agency
  or person knew or should have known that the conduct
  engaged in was a violation of this chapter. . . .

Accordingly, under RSA 91-A:8, attorney's fees shall be awarded
if the trial court finds that: (1) the lawsuit was necessary to
make the information available; and (2) "the body, agency, or
person knew or should have known that the conduct engaged in
was a violation of [RSA chapter 91-A]." Prof'l Firefighters
of N.H. v. HealthTrust, 151 N.H. 501, 507 (2004).

  Neither party contests that WMUR's petition for an injunction
was necessary for WMUR's cameras to gain access to the hearing.
The parties dispute only whether Perry knew or should have
known that his exclusion of the cameras violated RSA
chapter 91-A. WMUR argues that RSA 91-A:2 clearly states that any
person shall be allowed to videotape a public proceeding,
subject to exceptions which did not apply in this case. Every
person is presumed to know the law, WMUR asserts; thus, Perry
should have known that WMUR had a right to videotape the
hearing. The department argues that, even though RSA
chapter 91-A applied to the hearing, Perry reasonably believed that he
needed to balance WMUR's right to videotape the hearing against
Hardwick's due process right to be heard.

  As stated above, we have never decided whether or not there is
a constitutionally protected property interest in a hunting
license. We have,
Page 51
however, recognized that the privilege of holding a driver's
license is a legally protected interest requiring due process
prior to suspension. Bragg v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 141 N.H. 677, 678 (1997). Based upon the state
of the case law, we cannot conclude that Perry should have
known not to balance Hardwick's alleged due process rights
against WMUR's right under RSA chapter 91-A to videotape the
hearing. See Goode v. N.H. Legislative Budget
Assistant, 145 N.H. 451, 455 (2001) (concluding that
defendant neither knew nor should have known that its conduct
violated RSA chapter 91-A due, in part, to the state of case
law). As for whether Perry in fact knew that excluding WMUR's
cameras from the hearing would violate RSA chapter 91-A, we see
no error in the trial court's finding that he did not know that
his conduct would violate the statute because he was confused
about the extent to which a judicial standard, instead of RSA
chapter 91-A, applied to the proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court's denial of WMUR's request for attorney's fees.

  Affirmed.

  DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

[Fluff and Stuff]

Please spread the word everywhere you can and whenever you post about this story, show the digg link, http://digg.com/politics/Youtube_videographer_broadcasts_own_arrest_live

[Coconut]

Anyone want to go to KPD tonight and see if I can find out how to get my voice recorder back?

They said I have to talk to the Lt. in the morning.