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Why I love the Fed. Govt (longish)

Started by rogervw, September 02, 2006, 08:35 PM NHFT

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Dreepa

Quote from: Minsk on September 02, 2006, 09:49 PM NHFT
Quote from: Spencer on September 02, 2006, 09:35 PM NHFT
Having the biggest stick in the world makes you the target.

I don't think it's so much having the stick as the continual poking of said stick into hornet's nests...
exactly.

Rogervw... welcome to the forum.
I think parts of what you are saying is right on... also having the biggest military does not make it the best.
NKorea has a large one, the USSR had a large one that was not so good. etc.

Come to NH.

Russell Kanning

Quote from: rogervw on September 03, 2006, 02:07 PM NHFT
I think that secession/anarcy would be too weak to protect itself from tyrants.

If we achieve secession/anarchy we will have thrown off the most powerful government in history. Why couldn't we do that to the next tyrant too?

Minsk

Quote from: rogervw on September 03, 2006, 02:07 PM NHFT
I think that secession/anarcy would be too weak to protect itself from tyrants.

So after all that: Why would an anarchy be too weak to protect itself from tyrants?

Want a nuke? Spend money on a group that will buy and maintain a handful of nukes.
Want a defensive military? Spend some money on that.
As long as there are enough people with the same fears, there will be lots of money flowing.

So again: Why do you insist on point a gun at Russell's head to defend him from tyrrany? Sounds like a bit of a contradiction doesn't it?

Though don't worry, you're not the only one with those opinions. And for the forseeable future we are all pulling in the same direction... OTOH if the US government does eventually get beaten down to purely Constitutional levels, or thereabouts, you will probably find anarchy a lot less scary.

rogervw

Quote from: Russell Kanning on September 03, 2006, 02:41 PM NHFT

If we achieve secession/anarchy we will have thrown off the most powerful government in history. Why couldn't we do that to the next tyrant too?

Oh I think we could, it is just the years of oppression and human suffering that I would want to avoid.

Quote from: Minsk on September 03, 2006, 02:53 PM NHFT
So again: Why do you insist on point a gun at Russell's head to defend him from tyrrany?

What gun at Russel's head?  I agree that support should be volunatry.  I just think you need a large group working together.  A few free-riders would be fine.

Quote from: Minsk on September 03, 2006, 02:53 PM NHFT
And for the forseeable future we are all pulling in the same direction...
I agree and this is where the effort should be directed, until...

Quote from: Minsk on September 03, 2006, 02:53 PM NHFT
if the US government does eventually get beaten down to purely Constitutional levels, or thereabouts, you will probably find anarchy a lot less scary.

Probably...

Lex

Free Riders: Austrian v. Public Choice
By Jim Fedako
Posted on 7/13/2005

The latest exploits of Lance Armstrong in this year's Tour de France provide a solid backdrop for discussions contrasting the economic ideas of the Austrian School and the adherents of Public Choice.

Public Choice is predicated on the belief that individual preferences can be known and quantified. From this simplistic view of Thymology, the Public Choice school deduces supposed economic laws regarding government interventions in the market. Government is required because acting man cannot negotiate agreements effectively with other self-seeking acting men.

The Austrian School starts from an aprioristic axiom that humans act by using means to obtain ends. Their ends are individualistic and self-centered. The Austrians do not claim to know unrevealed individual preferences nor do they deduce the need for government interventionism in the market. Acting man is able to create working arrangements with other acting men that benefit all involved.

OK. Good and well. But what about the Tour? How can a bicycle race be applied in discussions of economic theory? Simple. Cycling is an excellent reflection of the market. 198 professionals begin each year's Tour with certain unrevealed goals. Sure, some end goals are widely known. For Lance, a seventh win. For Jan Ulrich, a chance to redeem himself. But what about the 196 other riders?

As in all sports, and all human activities for that matter, there are those few who sit at the pinnacle. The rest are simply one of the bunch. Sure they dream of winning the Tour, but more than likely they are concentrating on the wearing the best-in-the-mountains jersey, the best-in-the-sprints-jersey, winning a stage, or just securing a professional contract for next year.

Public Choice assumes that every racer has the same goals and will react like any other racer in all situations. The Austrians will have none of that. It is impossible to look at a rider and know for certain what he wants to achieve during any given day of the Tour. Certainly you may guess what his team has set for him but what really lies in his heart is unseen and unknown, at least until human action reveals his preferences.

In bicycle races, individual riders will typically "attack" the main field of riders in order to gain time over those other riders and a better chance of success. Better to be 1 of 4 in a small ?breakaway? group at the finish line than 1 of 198 in the large field.

In order to gain time, riders must work together by taking turns leading and blocking the wind so that the following riders can rest awaiting their turn at the front. So there you have it, 4 riders with widely divergent preferences working together for a common goal. The four have established a de facto contract that is to everyone?s benefit, even though none knows the other's true motives.

One may assume that they all are looking to win the stage. Possible. But it's also likely that one just wants some time in front of the cameras, another wants to pad time on rivals, a third is there just to assist his team?s goals, and the fourth wants the win so bad he can taste it.

But how do the four create this ad hoc contract? A quick glance, a nod, a wink, or a few words exchanged is all that is required for the four riders at hand to build a successful coalition. Public Choice will have none of this reality. They say that negotiation cannot be frictionless and that only through government interventions can people agree to work together.

What about the "free rider?" In Public Choice theory, the "free rider" always gums up the works. The "free rider" causes coalitions to collapse and contracts not to be formed. Think there are no "free riders' in the Tour.

Think again. Everyone wants to ride in a breakaway group for free. Who wouldn't? Conservation of energy is important when you are racing over 2,000 miles in three weeks. But pressures internal to the coalition typically force the "free rider" to perform. In reality no one really knows if the all racers in the breakaway are giving their fullest effort because no one really knows other's internalized desires and abilities.

There are always ?free riders? or ?free loaders? in all human activities. That becomes just another datum assumed when choosing amongst alternative choices. Every racer in the Tour understands this quite clearly. Accept it and move on.

Externalities? Come on: every action creates supposed externalities. Should Lance be taxed to offset help he received during the Tour from other riders who were actively pursuing their own selfish interest? Who would create and administer the Pigovian tax structure that would offset all of Lance?s gains and loses? Can even the Cray Supercomputer solve these equations and derive a payout before the 2006 Tour begins?

OK. Individual preferences unrevealed, externalities, ?free riders? everywhere, and ad hoc contracts being agreed upon without legal signatures. But what about society? What is best for the collective group of 198 riders? Can this spontaneous order (or disorder, depending on your viewpoint) be best for all? Is this even close to Pareto optimality? It all depends. If you agree that each rider has unrevealed goals, throw that neoclassical equilibrium out the window. The impossible task becomes the creation of an aggregate demand curve.

So, assume that you can create this curve. What would you have? A Tour that functioned much like the Soviet economy. As stated above, all riders want to be ?free loaders?, er ?riders,? in that they don?t really want to suffer over a hundred miles of mountain roads if their needs were truly going to be met otherwise. Why sweat and pound the asphalt when you can lazily ride and occasionally stop to view the sights?

A couple of problems will arise. First, all riders cannot be designated the Tour champ ? the Tour is not a Kindergarten class ? so all needs cannot be met. In order to correct for this, the results would have to be created in a manner that approximated the regressed preferences of the aggregate field. Lance would probably remain champ and the other riders would be slotted into their likely finishing positions ? all based on creating the efficient solution.

This lead to the second problem, this manner of racing would be slow and boring. Who would watch the riders literally tour France at a leisurely pace? Other than a spouse or two, probably just a few mothers, fathers and girlfriends. The Tour would be no more and 198 riders would be out of a job, all to satisfy some odd belief in equilibrium and utility. This is not a very satisfactory solution.

As you enjoy the Tour on TV remember that riders from many countries, speaking a host of different languages, are able to negotiate productive contracts that are mutually beneficial to both riders and viewers.

Lex

http://www.mises.org/story/1855

But Wouldn't Warlords Take Over?
By Robert Murphy
Posted on 7/7/2005

On two separate occasions in the last couple of weeks, people have asked me a familiar question:  ?In a system of ?anarcho-capitalism? or the free-market order, wouldn?t society degenerate into constant battles between private warlords??  Unfortunately I didn?t give adequate answers at the times, but I hope in this article to prove the adage that later is better than never.

APPLES AND ORANGES

When dealing with the warlord objection, we need to keep our comparisons fair. It won?t do to compare society A, which is filled with evil, ignorant savages who live under anarchy, with society B, which is populated by enlightened, law-abiding citizens who live under limited government.  The anarchist doesn?t deny that life might be better in society B.  What the anarchist does claim is that, for any given population, the imposition of a coercive government will make things worse.  The absence of a State is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to achieve the free society.

To put the matter differently:  It is not enough to demonstrate that a state of private-property anarchy could degenerate into ceaseless war, where no single group is strong enough to subjugate all challengers, and hence no one can establish ?order.?  After all, communities living under a State degenerate into civil war all the time.  We should remember that the frequently cited cases of Colombia and now Iraq are not demonstrations of anarchy-turned-into-chaos, but rather examples of government-turned-into-chaos.

For the warlord objection to work, the statist would need to argue that a given community would remain lawful under a government, but that the same community would break down into continuous warfare if all legal and military services were privatized.  The popular case of Somalia, therefore, helps neither side.  It is true that Rothbardians should be somewhat disturbed that the respect for non-aggression is apparently too rare in Somalia to foster the spontaneous emergence of a totally free market community.  But by the same token, the respect for ?the law? was also too weak to allow the original Somali government to maintain order.

Now that we?ve focused the issue, I think there are strong reasons to suppose that civil war would be much less likely in a region dominated by private defense and judicial agencies, rather than by a monopoly State.  Private agencies own the assets at their disposal, whereas politicians (especially in democracies) merely exercise temporary control over the State?s military equipment.  Bill Clinton was perfectly willing to fire off dozens of cruise missiles when the Lewinsky scandal was picking up steam.  Now regardless of one?s beliefs about Clinton?s motivations, clearly Slick Willie would have been less likely to launch such an attack if he had been the CEO of a private defense agency that could have sold the missiles on the open market for $569,000 each .[ii]

We can see this principle in the case of the United States.  In the 1860s, would large scale combat have broken out on anywhere near the same scale if, instead of the two factions controlling hundreds of thousands of conscripts, all military commanders had to hire voluntary mercenaries and pay them a market wage for their services?

CONTRACT THEORY OF GOVERNMENT

I can imagine a reader generally endorsing the above analysis, yet still resisting my conclusion.  He or she might say something like this:  ?In a state of nature, people initially have different views of justice.  Under market anarchy, different consumers would patronize dozens of defense agencies, each of which attempts to use its forces to implement incompatible codes of law.  Now it?s true that these professional gangs might generally avoid conflict out of prudence, but the equilibrium would still be precarious.?

?To avoid this outcome,? my critic could elaborate, ?citizens put aside their petty differences and agree to support a single, monopoly agency, which then has the power to crush all challengers to its authority.  This admittedly raises the new problem of controlling the Leviathan, but at least it solves the problem of ceaseless domestic warfare.?

There are several problems with this possible approach.  First, it assumes that the danger of private warlords is worse than the threat posed by a tyrannical central government.  Second, there is the inconvenient fact that no such voluntary formation of a State ever occurred.  Even those citizens who, say, supported the ratification of the U.S. Constitution were never given the option of living in market anarchy; instead they had to choose between government under the Articles of Confederation or government under the Constitution.

But for our purposes, the most interesting problem with this objection is that, were it an accurate description, it would be unnecessary for such a people to form a government.  If, by hypothesis, the vast majority of people?although they have different conceptions of justice?can all agree that it is wrong to use violence to settle their honest disputes, then market forces would lead to peace among the private police agencies.

Yes, it is perfectly true that people have vastly different opinions concerning particular legal issues.  Some people favor capital punishment, some consider abortion to be murder, and there would be no consensus on how many guilty people should go free to avoid the false conviction of one innocent defendant.  Nonetheless, if the contract theory of government is correct, the vast majority of individuals can agree that they should settle these issues not through force, but rather through an orderly procedure (such as is provided by periodic elections).

But if this does indeed describe a particular population, why would we expect such virtuous people, as consumers, to patronize defense agencies that routinely used force against weak opponents?  Why wouldn?t the vast bulk of reasonable customers patronize defense agencies that had interlocking arbitration agreements, and submitted their legitimate disputes to reputable, disinterested arbitrators?  Why wouldn?t the private, voluntary legal framework function as an orderly mechanism to settle matters of ?public policy??

Again, the above description would not apply to every society in history.  But by the same token, such warlike people would also fail to maintain the rule of law in a limited State.

FREE RIDERS?

A sophisticated apologist for the State?especially one versed in mainstream economics?might come back with yet another justification:  ?The reason a limited government is necessary is that we can?t trust the market to adequately fund legitimate police forces.  It may be true that 95 percent of a population would have similar enough views with respect to justice such that peace would obtain if they all contributed substantially to defense agencies dedicated to enforcing their views.?

?However,? the apologist could continue, ?if these police agencies have no right to extract contributions from everyone who endorses their actions, then they will be able to field a much smaller force.  The market fails specifically because of the free rider problem:  When a legitimate firm cracks down on a rogue agency, all law abiding people benefit, but in a free market they would not be obliged to pay for this ?public good.?  Consequently, rogue agencies, funded by malevolent outlaws, will have a much wider scope of operation under anarchy.?

Again, there are several possible replies to such a position.  First, let us reflect that a large standing army, ready to crush minority dissenters, is not an unambiguously desirable feature of government.

Second, the alleged problem of free riders would not be nearly as disastrous as many economists believe.  For example, insurance companies would ?internalize the externalities? to a large degree.  It may be true that an ?inefficient? number of serial killers would be apprehended if the relevant detective and police agencies had to solicit contributions from individual households.  (Sure, everyone gets a slight benefit from knowing a serial killer has been caught, but whether or not one person contributes probably won?t make the difference between capture or escape.)

Yet insurance companies that each held policies for thousands of people in a major city would be willing to contribute hefty amounts to eliminate the menace of a serial killer.  (After all, if he kills again, one of these companies will have to pay out hundreds of thousands of dollars to the estate of the victim.)  The same reasoning demonstrates that the free market could adequately fund programs to ?contain? rogue agencies.

Third, people need to really picture the nightmare scenario to see how absurd it is.  Imagine a bustling city, such as New York, that is initially a free market paradise.  Is it really plausible that over time rival gangs would constantly grow, and eventually terrorize the general public?[iii]  Remember, these would be admittedly criminal organizations; unlike the city government of New York, there would be no ideological support for these gangs.

We must consider that in such an environment, the law-abiding majority would have all sorts of mechanisms at their disposal, beyond physical confrontation.  Once private judges had ruled against a particular rogue agency, the private banks could freeze its assets (up to the amount of fines levied by the arbitrators).  In addition, the private utility companies could shut down electricity and water to the agency?s headquarters, in accordance with standard provisions in their contracts.

Of course, it is theoretically possible that a rogue agency could overcome these obstacles, either through intimidation or division of the spoils, and take over enough banks, power companies, grocery stores, etc. that only full-scale military assault would conquer it.  But the point is, from an initial position of market anarchy, these would-be rulers would have to start from scratch.  In contrast, under even a limited government, the machinery of mass subjugation is ready and waiting to be seized.

CONCLUSION

The standard objection that anarchy would lead to battling warlords is unfounded.  In those communities where such an outcome would occur, the addition of a State wouldn?t help.  Indeed, the precise opposite is true:  The voluntary arrangements of a private property society would be far more conducive to peace and the rule of law, than the coercive setup of a parasitical monopoly government.

Minsk

Quote from: rogervw on September 03, 2006, 05:35 PM NHFT
Quote from: Minsk on September 03, 2006, 02:53 PM NHFT
So again: Why do you insist on point a gun at Russell's head to defend him from tyrrany?

What gun at Russel's head?  I agree that support should be volunatry.  I just think you need a large group working together.  A few free-riders would be fine.

Cool, then we agreed earler and I could have shut up -- I'm fairly poor at that though ;)

The risk of talking about "state" and "government" is that throughout modern history they have always been funded through taxation, and through pointing guns at citizens who would rather not pay up. If you remove the force from government, what you wind up with is perfectly compatible with anarcho-capitalism... It might take some time for competition to develop in areas the cooperative-previously-know-as-government has long monopolized, but at least the competitors will not be fined, arrested or killed for their efforts.

Forastero

Quote from: rogervw on September 02, 2006, 08:35 PM NHFT
I humbly express my opinions only in order to generate discussion that may educate me and possiblly change my mind  And in no way mean to disrespect others who frequently post here.

First off---
I want the most freedoms/liberty for myself as possible.
I want the most freedoms/liberty for others as possible.
I want these freedoms/liberties to be maintained for long into the future.

I think that secession of NH or any state would not further freedom/liberty ?in the long term.

Here is my Rationale.

The world is a brutish place.  There are people in the world that do not support/believe in my right to freedom/liberty.  There are people (sheep) that will allow these persons to control their resources (labor, taxes, military...).  These 2 elements will generate aggressor nations.  I want an equally large military/defensive force to protect me from these persons. 

I personally would not be able to protect myself.  The ALL Volunteer Militia of New Hampshire would not be able to protect me. 

End of Rationale.

Some Points
I feel that there needs to be a balance of freedoms with the ability to maintain these freedoms into the future (*winces inwardly*, *braces for angry responses*).

Part of my thinking is that if you support secession from the federal govt, then logically you would support the secession from the state govt,?. And on down to the secession of the individual (anarchy).  Which just weakens defensibility further.  This would happen throughout the USA. 

We have a system of govt that can be used to effect change peacefully (as opposed to so many in the world that do not).  I feel that efforts would be better focused on cutting govt size, stripping govt power, and shrinking govt spending.  I think the yoke could sit pretty light (again winces).

Thank you for taking time to read and welcome all responses.
Roger VW

(FYI Am also posting on FTL BBS for more responses)



Well I dont support secession so this doesnt apply to me.

MaineShark

Quote from: rogervw on September 03, 2006, 05:35 PM NHFTWhat gun at Russel's head?  I agree that support should be volunatry.  I just think you need a large group working together.  A few free-riders would be fine.

If it's voluntary, then it's an anarchy, not a government.  Government's exist by initiating force against those who don't wish to participate.

If you truly believe that support should be voluntary, then you are talking about a bunch of anarchists hiring mercenaries.

Joe

SeanSchade

If you secede how will you protect yourself from the most powerful nation on Earth...the US? Especially if you are surrounded on all sides...VT, ME, MA. Now if ME and VT joined in it might be a little more feasible. That would make a nice sized country!

error

Quote from: SeanSchade on November 28, 2006, 11:29 PM NHFT
If you secede how will you protect yourself from the most powerful nation on Earth...the US? Especially if you are surrounded on all sides...VT, ME, MA. Now if ME and VT joined in it might be a little more feasible. That would make a nice sized country!

When you're surrounded, you can shoot in any direction! ;D

powerchuter

Quote from: rogervw on September 03, 2006, 02:07 PM NHFT
It will take me a bit to get through all this, but much seems to have missed my point.

I think that secession/anarcy would be too weak to protect itself from tyrants.

Quote from: Minsk on September 02, 2006, 09:18 PM NHFT
Scissors beat paper.
Rock beats scissors.
Nuke beats traditional military ;D

Then I want to be in the country with a nuke. 

Quote from: aries on September 02, 2006, 09:21 PM NHFT
I think it'd be great if we could all go about our merry lives without having to give the slighest thought to whether the government existed or not (assuming it does), because it is so unintrusive.

But it aint that way

But it could be

Quote from: Minsk on September 02, 2006, 09:38 PM NHFT
I guess what it really comes down to is this:
Do you feel that it is moral and necessary to point a gun at people who do not want to pay for the military your propose?

No I do not.  I feel that only a large enough group volunatrily supporting the milatry will be sufficient to protect me from tyrants that force their support.

Quote from: Caleb on September 03, 2006, 09:34 AM NHFT

However, I think you are wrong that an armed populace is not capable of repelling a foreign invasion.  Look at what has been done in Iraq by an insurgency, against the most powerful empire in history. 

This is the point I am making.  I want to be protected against the next most powerful empire in history.

Quote from: Russell Kanning on September 03, 2006, 11:38 AM NHFT
I don't think it is right for me to resist evil by force, so ... yes.

Until there is no evil, sadly I will need force to protect myself from evil. 
And I will would also protect you from those same evils.

Thank you all for the repsonses.

Quote:
"I feel that only a large enough group voluntarily supporting the military will be sufficient to protect me from tyrants that force their support."

Response:
You state "protect me" in the above quote!?!  It's YOUR duty to protect yourself...however you chose to do that...other than forcing other people to do it or contribute to it...


Quote:
"This is the point I am making.  I want to be protected against the next most powerful empire in history."

Response:
You state "I want to be protected" in the quote directly above...see previous response...